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Introduction
The right to property is probably the oldest real right, much before concepts
such as “right” or “real” (as opposed to “personal”1) were outlined. It has often
been regarded as a “natural” right, derived from nature.2 Therefore, controver-
sies on property are certainly as old as humanity itself. However, in the revolu-
tionary period, the right to property was deemed a fundamental right and
included as such in the charters approved at that time.3 This has continued up
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1 The distinction between real and personal rights was implicit in Roman categories of “actio in
rem” and “actio in personam” (Juan Iglesias, Derecho Romano, 8th ed., 1983, pp. 250–256), but
was developed in Mediaeval times (Luis Díez-Picazo, Fundamentos del Derecho Civil Patrimonial,
I, 4th ed., 1993, pp. 60–61).
2 Justinian’s Institutes explained: “Things are likewise obtained by us by natural law through
delivery; for nothing more accords with natural justice than to confirm the desire of an owner to
transfer his property to another” (II, I, 40). The quote is from the translation by S. P. Scott,
available at http://www.constitution.org/sps/sps02.htm). John Locke affirmed that through one’s
labor, a right to property in the work of his hands emerges (Two Treatises on Government, book II,
chapter V, 27).
3 See Articles 2 and 17 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789).
See also Section 1 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776).
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to our times,4 including in modern constitutions and international and regional
human rights treaties. Its rationale is mostly to protect the right to property
against governmental action, even though there are opposite policy preferences
as to regulation of property rights at the domestic level. This is why taking
property in the public interest or in the public need is frequently mentioned in
those texts.5 However, the restrictions deriving from the protection of the public
interest in regard to environmental values and livelihoods, natural resources,
coasts, forest villagers or indigenous people are recognized in an overwhelming
majority of the legal orders at the constitutional or statutory level or in the case
law. Those limits become visible especially in regard to land law in different
scenarios. Developmental challenges, new technologies and emerging economic
powers or models necessitate portraying and rethinking land law restrictions
from the perspective of human rights since the claims as to the right to property
as a fundamental right transform and develop rapidly in domestic or regional
human rights litigation and in constitutional designs. The land law disputes,
which had been traditionally viewed as a quintessential local matter, are in-
creasingly affected by supranational legal norms and procedures. Accordingly,
a number of recurring themes typify the various cases, especially in seeking to
strike an appropriate balance between the right to property and the authority of
governments to regulate or expropriate land to promote the public interest.6
This collaborative paper aims at focusing on land law and the limits on the
right to property from historical, comparative and international perspectives to
analyze continuity, divergences, differences and similarities in approaches in
seemingly independent contexts. First, the paper deals with property in land and
its limits in Jewish law, canon law, Islamic law and Hindu law, while it puts
specific emphasis on Roman law conceptualizations affecting current domestic
and international settings. In so doing, the paper seeks to demonstrate what
might be considered a counterintuitive argument: while natural law or moral-
based law theories of property rights are conventionally associated with the right
of an individual, the same sets of arguments also point to promoting the interests
4 Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Article 17 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000).
5 See Article 17 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and first
paragraph of Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights.
6 For a more elaborate analysis of the case law below, see: Amnon Lehavi, The Global Law of the
Land, 81 University of Colorado Law Review 425 (2010); Amnon Lehavi, Unbundling Harmoniza-
tion: Public versus Private Law Strategies to Globalize Property, 15 Chicago Journal of International
Law 452 (2015); Amnon Lehavi, Land Law in the Age of Globalization and Land Grabbing, in
Comparative Property Law: Global Perspectives 290–310 (Michele Graziadei & Lionel Smith edi-
tors, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017).
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of the community as a whole, and to the need to strike an appropriate balance
between individual and community in constructing land law. Second, it portrays
modern constitutional structures based on different policy preferences of two
emerging economies, India and Turkey. Third, the paper analyzes international
human rights disputes, ranging from claims of protection of rights of indigenous
people to conflicts arising from cross-border acquisition of land, in light of the
growing case law on these matters. Cutting across many periods and jurisdictions,
the paper addresses what is essentially a leitmotif in property law: identifying the
tension between individual and community in delineating the boundaries of own-
ership, control, and use of scarce resources, and the particular resolution of such
tension in the case of land.
1. Historical and religious perspectives: property in land and
limits on property rights
The modern conception of land law and the limits on property rights are widely
modeled in the principal legal systems on individualistic and liberal ideologies,
although sometimesmedieval influences are still present and one cannot of course
underestimate the importance of the socialist model. Moreover, religious and
customary laws cannot be excluded from this picture. In fact, in many cases, these
sources of law have had a deep influence on the historical development of modern
state laws, and even more significantly, they are self-bearers of concepts of land
ownership that can interact with the views of secular state laws. This issue is well
understood in a pluralistic perspective that promotes the coexistence and interac-
tion in the same context of multiple sets of rules, institutions, and values, which
cangive rise tophenomenaof either conflict or assimilation.7 Thesephenomenaare
particularly important in post-colonial legal systems, where during the coloniza-
tion period some concepts and rules on land ownership were introduced to replace
theprevious set of concepts and rules that hada religious or customaryorigin.
Therefore, some points are worth considering with reference to the jurispru-
dence of land ownership that has developed in the main religious and customary
legal traditions. From a methodological point of view, it is necessary to be aware
that the same religious laws, their theological assumptions, technical concepts
and solutions, as elaborated by plural learned traditions, interacted with many
customary systems in different geographical areas. As a result, the variability of
7 Within the huge literature on this issue, see Masaji Chiba (ed), Asian Indigenous law in interac-
tion with received law, London-New York, KPI, 1986.
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local religious legal systems can be very high. Nevertheless, the consideration of
some fundamental conceptions can help to add further dimensions of discourse
that make it possible to draw a more complete picture, which is all the more
important when one considers that the interaction between different rules and
concepts can raise very significant problems in the protection of property rights
today by state laws and international law. In this regard particularly important
are indigenous customary land rights, whose basic features do not match the
concepts that are at the basis of state property laws and are prompting, particu-
larly at the international level, the search for new instruments to assure their
acknowledgment.
In religious laws, land is not seen as a mere economic asset but is naturally
embedded in an entire conception of the world, its origin, the proper conduct of
human beings and their salvation. Ownership rules may be understood in this
context. For example, the Islamic jurisprudence on property is closely and inevi-
tably linked to theological assumptions.8 From an Islamic point of view every-
thing was created by God and ownership originally resides in God.9 One conse-
quence of this is that property rights are limited and must be enjoyed in the
observance of the ethical rules of Islam.10 The fact that everything belongs to God
is not in conflict with the fact that private ownership of land is permitted and even
encouraged for productive purposes. Property must be protected because it is
recognized as fulfilling the needs of the faithful. Like in other religious traditions,
limits on property rights can legitimately derive from the need to satisfy basic
communal needs. Islamic jurisprudence states that some goods, for example,
rivers, have a public nature. They are considered community property and are
intended for public use. From a technical point of view, waqf has been a funda-
mental institution to immobilize property aiming to fulfil a charitable purpose.
Waqf also served, particularly in the Ottoman Empire, to provide a basis for the
economic independence of ulama (religious leaders) against the political power.
The Islamic principles on land law have proven to be flexible enough to coexist
with different land regimes in the vast Islamic world.
An interesting approach in the Islamic law tradition concerning the concept
of private property can be observed within the Hanafi school of jurisprudence,
which was the dominant school of the Ottoman legal thought.11 Under this
8 See Siraj Sait andHillary Lim, Land, Law and Islam, London-New York, Zed Books, 2006.
9 Quran, 2:29; 31:20, 11:61; 7:74; 14:32; 45:13; trans. by M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, Oxford World
Classics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008.
10 Quran 3:15; 17:100; 89:20; 100:8
11 Although Quran includes general principles relating to property right, the regulation and
protection of it is not dwelled upon.
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approach, private property finds its source in the “agreement”12 between God and
the faithful where the faithful is burdened with some certain obligations against
God deriving from divine commands but is also vested with certain rights, such as
the right to property or the right to life.13 Rights such as property rights do not
exist naturally: they come to life as a result of the acceptance of the obligations.14
Therefore, rights should be exercised in limitation with those obligations since
they exist in a direct correlation with them.
On the other hand, the notion that the recognition of private property is
necessary for the preservation of the fabric of the society can also be observed
within the Islamic jurisprudence. According to this approach, a society without
private property would fall into chaos, as history shows that communal property
had been the one of the main reasons behind social conflicts.15 Therefore, private
property is the demonstration of God’s grace to the faithful.16 Still, it will not be
wrong to argue that the problem as regards the essential character of Islamic
law’s approach to property right is far from being definitely resolved. While a
considerable number of Islamic law scholars claim that the Islamic law’s ap-
proach to property rights is individualistic in nature,17 the majority view sees it as
12 Hilmi Ziya Ülken, İslâm Düşüncesi, İÜ Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, İstanbul 1946, pp. 81–83;
Fahri Demir, İslâm Hukukunda Mülkiyet Hakkı ve Servet Dağılımı, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayın-
ları, Ankara, 2012, pp.164–170.
13 In Islamic law, there is a clear distinction between the ‘rights of God’ (huquq Allah) and the
‘rights of themen’ (huquq al‘ibad). For a general discussion on this dictonomy seeAnverM. Emon,
Huquq Allah and Huquq al’ibad: A Legal Heuristic for Natural Rights Regime, Islamic Law and
Society, Vol. 13, No:3, 2006, pp. 321–395; Miriam Hoexter, Huquq Allah and Huquq al-‘Ibad as
Reflected in the Waqf Institution, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, Vol 19, 1995, pp. 133–135;
Mohammed Kamali, Fundamental Rights of the Individual: An Analysis of Haqq in Islamic Law,
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol 10, Fall 1993 and Baber Johansen, Sacred and
Religious Elements in Hanafite Law, Islam et Politique au Magreb, Ed. Ernest Gellner & JC Vatin,
Paris, 1981, pp. 281–303. According to some scholars ‘property right’ is the most essential, if not
the only, huquq ‘ibad. (NJ Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, The International
and Comparative LawQuarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1957), p. 50).
14 Hasan Hacak, İslam Hukuk Düşüncesinde Özel Mülkiyet Anlayışı, M.Ü. İlahiyat Fakültesi
Dergisi, Vol. 29, No:2 (2005), pp. 108–109; Ebu Zeyd ed-Debusî, Takvîmü’l-Edille, (inq.by Halil
MuhyiddinMeys), DKB, Beirut 1402/2007, p. 41.
15 id 14, p. 112; Al-Taftazani, at-Talwih fi Kashfi Haqaiq at Tanqih, Vol II, 1304, p. 174
16 Abu Bakr Ibn al-arabi;Ahkam al-Quran, 3rd ed., Vol I, DKB, Beirut, 2003, pp. 24–25.
17 It is often argued that the first section of the 1192th article of the Ottoman Civil Code Mejelle is
influenced by this individualistic view. (Art 1192: Any personmay deal with his property owned in
absolute ownership as he wishes. But if the rights of any other person are concerned therein, the
owner of such property may not deal with it as though he were the independent owner thereof).
See Saba Habachy, Property, Right and Contract in Muslim Law, Columbia Law Review, Vol 62
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having an overarching social function.18 One must also remember that the con-
cept of “public interest” (maslahah) is a part of the Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)
and the five necessities (al dururiyat al khamsan) 19 namely, life – lineage –
religion – intellect and property that Sharia targets to protect equally fall into the
domain ofmaslahah.20 While on one hand, the right to property of the faithful was
to be protected by the Sharia, on the other hand, the ultimate goal of “establish-
ing social justice through the process of managing and allocating physical and
human resources in a way that harmonizes the objective goals of distributive
equity and economic efficiency”21 was also to be realized. Thus, the restriction of
property rights in favor of the public interest is in line with the general principles
(and goals) of Islamic law.22
In Jewish law, similarly, all of creation belongs to God. Land is central to
Jewish legal thought. Land rights are conceived as limited and contingent, and an
extensive set of rules governs the use of land. The lordship of God over all creation
implies that wealth is conceived as a gift. Property has a social dimension and
(1962) p.456–457; Ferit Hakki Saymen & Kemal Elbir, Türk Eşya Hukuku, Filiz Kitapevi, Istanbul,
1963, pp. 226–228.
18 See Ali el-Hafif, el-Milkiyyetü’l-ferdiyye ve tahdîduhâ fi’l-İslâm Mecelletü’l-Ezher, Vol. 36,
Cairo, 1964, pp. 3–4; Adnan Güriz, Teorik Olarak Mülkiyet Sorunu, AÜHFY, Ankara, 1969, pp. 60–
64; Halit Çalış, İslam Hukukunda Özel Mülkiyete Getirilen Kısıtlamalar, Yediveren Kitap, Istanbul,
2004, pp. 68–77.
19 MohammadHashimKamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (rev.ed.) Islamic Texts Society,
Cambridge, 1991, p. 271–273.
20 The prominent Shafi scholar Al-Ghazali definedmaslahah as the consideration which secures
a benefit or prevents a harm but is also in harmony with the aim and objective of Sharia. Al-
Ghazali laid out that these objectives consist of protecting the five values of ‘religion, intellect,
life, lineage and property’. Any measure which secures these values falls within the scope of
maslahah. (Al-Ghazali, El-Mustasfa: Islam Hukukunda Deliller ve Yorum Metodoloji, (trans.) by
Yunus Apaydın, Vol.1, Rey Yayıncılık, Kayseri, 1993, pp.332–336).
21 Masudul Alam Choudhury & Uzir Abdul Malik, The Foundations of Islamic Political Economy,
Macmillan, London, 1992, p.1; Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Place of Ethical Obligations in Islamic
Law, UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law, Vol. 4, no. 1, 2004, pp.1–40; Anver M. Emon,
Islamic Natural Law Theories, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 24–37. For a recent and interest-
ing view that this moralistic purpose was both conceptually and structurally indispensable for the
normative coherence of early Islamic jurisprudence see Omar Farahat, A Devotional Theory of
Law: Epistemology andMoral Purpose in Early Islamic Jurisprudence, Journal of Law and Religion,
Vol 31, no: 1, 2016, pp. 42–69.
22 The influential Islamic scholar Joseph Schacht had argued that although Islamic law was
throughly individualistic, it also strived for a social reform and the improvement of the position of
the socially weak. (Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Clarendon, Oxford, 1969, p.
269). This duality in characteristics would naturally pervade the whole system including the
understanding of ‘property’ and ‘ownership.’
Land Law and Limits on Property 9
Brought to you by | Università di Torino
Authenticated
Download Date | 5/26/17 12:19 PM
solidarity is required towards those in need. An important role is played by
consecrated property (hekdesh), dedicated to the needs of the temple of Jerusa-
lem, and then to various charitable purposes.23
This social dimension of Jewish property law can be observed in the com-
mands that stipulate one to use and enjoy his/her property right in a balanced
way with community needs. It can even be argued that the property right in
Jewish law is a derivation of the right holder’s duty of not to interfere with
another’s (neighbor’s) property. The individual’s ‘right’ over a property was
recognized as long as that this recognition did not harm the interests of the
society and the interference with one’s property right was closely linked with
potential harm.24
The Jewish law, in a way, sacrifices or subordinates individual property rights
to the concept of “harchakat nezikin’ (restraining of nuisances) and more broadly
to prevention of actions considered as 'midat Sdom’ (roughly equivalent to the
modern “abuse of rights” doctrine).25 This resulting social obligation (or even a
legal obligation) not only includes refraining from generating harm to neighbors
or fellow citizens, but also to the public at large and the physical environment.26
The result is one of various restrictions on property rights in favor of the protec-
tion of the environment or promotion of social justice.27
Therefore, it follows that property considerations are thwarted by the societal
(and environmental) considerations. It can also be argued that the individual was
not only under the duty of not creating harm to the environment but also was
given the task to tend, protect and enrich it. “God places man in the garden of
23 See Menachem Elon (ed.), The Principles of Jewish Law, Encyclopedia Judaica, Keter Publish-
ing House Jerusalem, 1975, p. 701.
24 Aryeh Carmell, Judaism and the Quality of the Environment, in Challenge: Torah Views on
Science and Its Problems, Eds. Arych Carmell & Cyril Domb, 2nd ed., 1978, Feldheim Publishers,
Jerusalem, pp. 500–507; Meir Tamari, Social Responsibility of Jewish Individuals, in Tikkun Olam:
Social Responsibility in Jewish Thought and Law, Eds. David Chatz & Chaim I. Waxman & Nathan
J. Diament, 1997, pp. 239–240.
25 On ‘abuse of rights’ in Jewish Law, see Shmuel Shilo, Kofin Al Midat S’dom: Jewish Law’s
Concept of Abuse of Rights, Israel Law Review, Vol. 15, no.1, 1980, pp. 49–78; Aaron Kirschen-
baum, Jewish Law and the Abuse of Rights, Tel Aviv University Studies in Law, Vol. 5, 1980–1982,
pp. 98–114.
26 Elliot N Dorff, What is Tikkun Olam and Why Does it Matter? An Overview from Antiquity to
Modern Times in Tikkun Olam: Judiasm, Humanism and Transcendence, Eds. David Birnbaum &
Martin S. Cohen, New ParadigmMatrix Publishing, 2014, pp. 30–33.
27 Moti Banyan, Real Estate & Planning and Building Laws in the Principles of the Jewish Law,
Bursi Press, 2015 pp. 53–56, 154–155 (Hebrew); George J. Webber, The Principles of the Jewish Law
of Property, Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1928),
pp. 82–93.
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Eden to till it and keep it,” as said in the Book of Genesis.28 Various command-
ments express the idea that ‘God, not Man is the rightful Lord of the Land’29and
since God gave the property rights, no man could usurp them; not even kings.30
Jewish law also instills respect for the earth and its cycles through intricate
agricultural commandments such as the ancient commandment to let the earth lie
fallow every seventh year.31
The Jewish legal tradition does not connect individuality and freedom with
property rights. On the contrary, the values that are pronounced in this context
are: solidarity, cooperation, social consideration and broader societal concerns –
these are given much importance when balanced against the rights of individuals.
When we also consider the fact that property rights in Jewish law were never
explicitly laid out and were developed gradually in line with the societal needs, it
can be argued that in ancient Jewish law, the primary beneficiary of the indivi-
dual’s right over a property was “the community.” The protection of public
health, the fostering of social justice and the maintenance of the urban aesthetics
were amongst those targeted social benefits, as were the sustainment of natural
resources. All those considerations accounted for the rationale behind the restric-
tions on the individual’s property rights.
Canon law shares with Islamic and Jewish law the idea that all property
belongs to God. This seems to be a necessary consequence of the idea of creation.
Coughlin highlights that, according to theologians such as Thomas Aquinas,
everything belongs to God, material goods are meant for the benefit of all, and
men are conceived as having a mere power of stewardship.32 Private property is
sometimes connected to the original sin, causing inequality between men, but the
anthropology underlying Canon law fully justifies private property as a means to
the end of development of human potentiality. Private property then acquires the
status of a natural right. Like in other religious traditions, property has a neces-
sary social dimension. Private property cannot be exercised in an egoistic way
and should always go along with social responsibility. Again, property also
served from a religious point of view as an economic basis to stand against
28 Genesis 2:15 The JerusalemBible, Koren Publishers Jerusalem, 1992.
29 Exodus 19:5; Deuteronomy 19:1; Psalms 24:1; Psalms 97:9, The Jerusalem Bible, Koren Pub-
lishers 1992.
30 Kings 21:2, The JerusalemBible, Koren Publishers 1992.
31 Leviticus 25:1–6, The JerusalemBible, Koren Publishers 1992.
32 See for an extensive analysis, J.J Coughlin, “Church Property: the Unity of Law and Theology”,
Notre Dame Law School, Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 07–23, 2007. http://ssrn.com/ab
stract=975836, and Drostan Maclaren, Private Property and Natural Law, Aquinas papers, no. 8,
Oxford, Blackfriars, 1948 (quoted in Coughlin).
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persecution and political interference. Berman makes reference to the fact that
the Church has had enormous wealth and owned more than one-fourth of the
land in Western Europe. Berman remarks that it is not surprising that ecclesias-
tical courts developed a substantial body of property law. However, “the canon
law of property was influenced by contemporary secular law to much greater
extent than was the canon law of family relations. For one thing, it was never
suggested that property – even ecclesiastical property – had a sacramental
character. Material resources of the church were always treated as part of its
temporal power.”33
According to the cosmological foundations of Hindu law, everything is a
manifestation of the divine rather than the creation of a God. Land and more
generally property are conceived as a means to accomplish ritual duties that are
necessary for upholding the cosmic and social order. In this sense, property is
functional to dharmic duties. Other aspects that may be highlighted with refer-
ence to Hindu jurisprudence on property are the possibility of multiple owner-
ship, and the fact that the limits to own and use the land depend on social status –
which is no surprise – but in this context more specifically on membership in a
caste, and thus is theoretically part of a religious understanding based on dhar-
ma. Commenting on a seminal article by Derrett,34 Davis remarks that it was
“characteristic of the Hindu jurisprudential view of property to admit that there
could be several owners of a thing, especially when it came to land. Within the
joint family, the multiple and concurrent claims of sons to a portion of the family
estate typify this idea of co-existent svatvas [ownerships]. Outside the joint family,
the easiest example of this fractured sense of property is land tenure.” Davis also
observes a striking correspondence between texts on dharma and historical
evidence of medieval land tenure in India, highlighting at least a general pattern
for the fact that “higher status meant greater control over the extent of property;
lower status meant derivative forms of ownership without alienation rights,
though with legal guarantees.”35
The idea of sacredness of the land is prominent in indigenous land laws.
Glenn uses the term “chtonic law” to provide an internal perspective based on a
concept of harmony with the land. Thus, relationship with land is central to
chthonic law and understood in different terms than in modern laws. As Glenn
33 H. J. Berman, Law and Revolution: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge
(MA), Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 237.
34 D. R. Davis Jr., The Spirit of Hindu Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 100.
See also J.D.M Derrett, “The Development of the Concept of Property in India”, in Essays in
Classical andModern Hindu Law, Vol. 2, Leiden, Brill, 1977.
35 Donald Davis, The Spirit of Hindu Law, p.100.
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explains: “Living close to the land and in harmony with it means limiting
technology which could be destructive of natural harmony ... there is no reason to
accumulate land, or map it (other than to show trails); there is nothing to be done
to it or with it, except enjoy its natural fruits. Chthonic notions of property are
therefore those of a chthonic life, and the human person is generally not elevated
to a position of domination, or dominium, over the natural world.”36 Communal
property is the rule. Property law is based on a web of relationships within the
group and between groups with respect to the land. This also entails that land is
not fully disposable and the limits of its use depend on the needs of the group.
Of course, there is a risk of oversimplification in these brief observations
about the jurisprudence of property in religious laws and customary laws. Nowa-
days, no law is pure and what we have is a continuous phenomenon of interac-
tion. As an interim conclusion, if one concept such as “property”may have many
faces because of religion- or place-specific values and meanings that are cultu-
rally connected to it, then this would translate in turn to different property
regimes, and in particular to a different balancing between the individual and the
community in the ownership, control, and use of land.
2. Roman law as a case study for conceptualizations of the
right to property and the features of land law
2.1. The lasting influence of the Roman concept of property
It is often argued that property as a liberal concept finds its origins in Roman
law.37 The protection of private property is one characteristic of Roman law which
had a lasting influence on modern legal systems. (Absolute) private property
rights, among other private law institutions such as ‘obligatio/obligation,’ were
the essential heritage of Roman law to later centuries. The ‘classical’ liberal
conception of property – thought to be modelled after the Roman notion – which
views the right to property as a subjective and nearly absolute right (plena in re
potestas) dictated the way modern politics and law make sense of the institu-
tion.38 Property right is an individual right that is only restricted by the rights of
36 H. P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, 5th edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015,
p. 69.
37 Gottfried Dietze, In Defence of Property, H. Rodney Co, Chicago, 1963, p. 14.
38 For a comprehensive treatment of the characteristics of ‘classical property right’ see Sjef Van
Erp, From ‘classical’ to modern European property law, in Essays in Honour of Konstantinos
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others or the public interest. Accordingly, it follows that the holder of this right
can use (usus), reap the benefits of (fructus), and dispose of his/her property
(abusus); and all these aspects of property rights stem from classical Roman law
although the three fundamental powers vested in the owner of a property (ius
utendi – ius fruendi – ius abutendi) were drawn up by jurists in the Middle Ages.
However, the Roman notion of ownership did not re-appear until the eighteenth
century with the rise of the commercialized society in Europe. The withering away
of the monopoly of the sovereign’s divine right over property opened up a new
channel for the expression of liberty and individualism.39
Thus, it would not be wrong to state that the Continental European codifica-
tions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were the manifestations of the
emerging liberalism wave in the legal sphere, which espoused ‘private property’
and the ‘freedom to use it at one’s will.’ It was only natural that the great
codifications of that era had championed the main claims of the French Revolu-
tion,40 namely ‘freedom’ and ‘equality,’ and had elevated the right to property to
a state of being ‘inviolable and sacred,’ ‘absolute,’ ‘indivisible’ and ‘exclusive’
right. The historical and legal foundation of this approach was based on the
‘Roman concept of ownership.’ The drawbacks of reducing the variances of the
Roman notion of property right to a single concept under a system that lasted for
25 centuries are evident and thus led to a rather incomplete conclusion on the
nature of the Roman understanding of ownership.
2.2. A social aspect of the ‘liberal’ Roman right to property?
It did not take long before the Roman influence on the ‘classical’ liberal under-
standing of property started to be challenged by other competing understandings
D. Kerameus/Festschrift für Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Vol. I, Athens/Brussels: Ant. A. Sakkou-
las/Bruylant, pp. 1517–1533.
39 “Private property creates for the individual a sphere in which he is free of the state ... It is the
soil in which the seeds of freedom are nurtured and in which the autonomy of the individual and
ultimately all intellectual and material progress are rooted. In this sense, it has even been called
the fundamental prerequisite for the development of the individual.” Ludwig Von Mises, Liberal-
ism (trans.) by Ralph Raico, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012, pp. 67–68.
40 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen 17: “La propriété étant un droit inviolable et
sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce n’est lorsque la nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l’exige
évidemment, et sous la condition d’une juste et préalable indemnité. (Since property is an inviolable
and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally deter-
mined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been
previously and equitably indemnified).
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of property rights as being unjust or imperfect.41 The beginning of the twentieth
century witnessed the rise into prominence of probably the most influential of
these competing understandings: the ‘social function of ownership.’ The cele-
brated French jurist Leon Duguit is frequently cited as the founder of the notion of
the ‘social function’ of property rights and in this sense may be viewed as the
antagonist of the Roman concept of ownership. His views of ‘property not being a
right but a social function’42 can be argued to pave the way for the transpiration of
the legal and intellectual basis for the justifications of modern restrictions on
property rights in different cases. These limits vary from rent controls, anti-
eviction regulations, urban planning and redistribution via land reform programs
to the reconsideration of intellectual property rights and the expropriation by the
State.43 The prevalent idea was that the ‘Roman idea of ownership’ granted the
owner an absolute, sacred, and nearly limitless right over his property, so that a
new social function of property right was required to be taken into account in
order to emphasize the interdependent connection between the collective eco-
nomic needs of the community and individual property–with such a connection
being arguably overlooked by the classical liberal thinkers.44
In light of those aforementioned facts, one might come to the conclusion that
the ‘Roman’ ownership lacked any social characteristics, being viewed solely
from an individualistic perspective, and that the modern social approach to
41 See PJ Proudhon, What is property? An inquiry into the principles of right and government,
(trans.) by Benjamin R. Tucker, Princeton 1876; Karl Marx, The economic and philosophical manu-
scripts of 1844, (trans.) by Martin Miligan, Dover publications, New York, 2007. See generally MC
Mirow, The Social Obligation Norm of Property, Duguit, Hayem and others, 22 Florida Journal of
International Law, 2010, pp. 191–226, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac
t_id=1662226 ; Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, The Social Function of Property: A Comparative
Law Perspective, 25 Fordham Law Review 1004 (2011) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=1960022.
42 “On peut dire qu’en fait la conception de la propriété droit subjectif disparaît pour faire place à
la conception de la propriété fonction sociale” (Onemay say that in fact the concept of property as a
subjective right disappears, to be replaced by the concept of property as a social function) (Léon
Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 3rd ed., Paris, 1927, p. 618). For similar approaches of
Duguit’s contemporary French jurists see Georges Renard & Louis Trotobas, La fanction sociale de
la propriété privée, Paris, 1920; Emmanuel Lévy, La vision socialiste du droit, Paris, 1926.
43 For the influence of Duguit’s views on the concept of property right in South American legal
systems see MC Mirow, Latin American Law: A History of private law and institutions in Spanish
America, University of Texas Press, Austin, 2004, p. 205. For the influence of the doctrine of
“property as a social function” on modern Arab codes see Guy Bechor, The Sanhuri Code and the
Emergence of Modern Arab Civil Law, Brill, Leiden, 2007, pp. 99–143.
44 Léon Duguit, les transformations générales du droit privé depuis le code napoléon, 2nd ed.,
Paris, 1920, p. 20.
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property rights – which gives way to various limitations on the use of property by
its owner –was completely alien to the Romans.45
The challenging of such an assumption should begin with the fact that there
was not a single, unitary understanding of ‘ownership’ throughout all periods of
the history of Roman law. Moreover, there were even times when different types
of ownership had co-existed. This contrast can also be seen in the plurality of
the terms that the Romans employed to indicate the power/authority one could
possess over a thing: ‘Meum esse’ and ‘Mancipium’46 were the most ancient ones
amongst them, and it is nearly impossible to give their exact definition in
modern terms. What is certain, though, is that both terms denoted the power of
the father (pater) over persons and things of the family (familia), and the
difference between them was related to their scope. ‘Meum esse’ was broader
and included all objects of ownership as well as the free members of the family
while mancipium was narrower in the way that it excluded res nec mancipi.47
Both terms are far from being the ancient equivalent of the modern term of
‘ownership.’ However, this lack of synonymy should not imply that the institu-
tion of ownership did not exist in ancient Roman law. Rather, it should serve as
an indication for the absence of a precise corresponding notion.48 In classical
legal language, new terms came to be used to denote what we would call
‘ownership’ today: Dominium and proprietas. Dominium was the older of the two
and first appeared in writings during the end of the Republic. Proprietas, on the
45 It is important to note here that the general hostility to Roman law which was based on an
assumption that it encouraged commercialism, exploitation and individualism unfitting for a
moral existence, was present in the European minds since the Middle Ages. See James Q. Whit-
man, The moral menace of Roman Law and the making of commerce: Some Dutch evidence, 105
Yale Law journal 1841 (1996); James Q. Whitman, Long live the hatred of Roman Law, 2 Re-
chtsgeschichte, 2003, pp. 40–57; Gerald Strauss, Law, resistance and the state: The Opposition to
Roman Law in Reformation Germany, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986.
46 The original meaning of the term ‘mancipium’ is much discussed in literature. See Bonfante,
Scritti giuridici varii, Proprieta e Servitu, Forme primitive ed evoluzione della proprieta romano vol
II, Torino 1918, p. 88; WW Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law; Cambridge
University Press, 2011, p. 60, 95; Fernand De Vissher, Mancipium et Res Mancipi SDHI vol II 1936
pp. 292–301; Georges Cornil, Du Mancipium au dominium, Festschrift P. Koschaker Weimar, t.I.
1939 p. 404–444 ; Vincenzo Arango-Ruiz, Istitutizoni di dritto Romano, 14th ed., Napoli 1984.
47 Res mancipiwas the type of property that was particularly important to the Romans which
could only be conveyed by the methods of transfer:mancipatio or in iure cessio. All the remaining
property was considered as being res nec mancipi. (Alfred Berger, Encyclopedic dictionary of
Roman Law, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1980:ResMancipi).
48 Gyorgy Diosdi, Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman Law, Akadémiai Kiadó, Buda-
pest,1970, p. 60.
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other hand, was a later creation. Although it was initially used to distinguish
between different types of powers over the property,49 with time, it became the
synonym of dominium.50
The discrepancy regarding the institution of ‘ownership’ in Roman law was
not confined to the terms that denoted it. It also existed in regard to the degree of
power that was vested in the holder of the ‘right.’ The quiriatry ownership (the
ownership under ius Quiritium51) was the type of ownership that the modern
codifications had used as a model, while framing the ‘classical’ notion of the right
to property. Therefore, some further explanations are needed to underline the
differences between the quiriatry ownership (dominium ex iure Quiritium) and the
other – and more liberal – type of ownership under Roman law: bonitary owner-
ship.52 Dominium ex iure Quiritium was the type of ownership that was acquired in
conformity with the principles of ius Quiritium and was to be protected by the
‘legally recognized’ procedural action (rei vindicatio) of ius Quiritium. Rei vindica-
tio was legally recognized in the sense that any unlawful interference with the
right of ownership was addressed in the courts of Rome by the means of rei
vindicatio and if anyone was denied his power over an object that belonged to him
under ius Quiritium, he could hold the other party accountable.53 Since it was only
the Roman citizens who could bring that action in a Roman court, any non-Roman
who held a ‘res mancipi,’ that is the category of objects54 which the ius Quirtium
stipulated to be transferred or acquired via the ‘modes of acquisitions recognized
by ius Quirtium,’55 would not enjoy any legal protection whatsoever under Roman
law. This type of ownership was probably the continuance of the familial-commu-
nitarian agricultural land ownership.
49 Such as the difference between the restricted real right over an object and the right of -the
naked- ownership over it (nuda proprietas); or the difference between possession and ownership.
SeeGai.I.2,30;2,92; D. 7,1,9,4.
50 SeeD.41,1,13 pr.
51 Ius quirtium was the ancient -customary- law which was very formalistic and rigid mainly
owing to its religious roots. It was only valid for the citizens (cives) of Rome.
52 In bonis habere; seeGai. 2, 41.
53 The unified and absolute nature of this general vindication action (rei vindicatio) shall be
considered to be the “paradigm of the absolute nature of Roman ownership.” Ugo Mattei, Basic
Principles of Property Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Introduction, Greenwood Press,
2000, p. 183.
54 The category of the objects that were deemed to be res mancipi was exhaustive. The things that
were considered to be res mancipi in Roman law were: slaves, beasts of burden, land and houses
on Italian soil, rustic and prandial servitudes.
55 Namelymancipatio and in iure cessio (Gai. I. 16).
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The system was tailored so as to exclude any foreigner from holding things
which the Romans assumed to be vital for the public good.56 It was only the
Roman citizen who could have a dominium ex iure Quiritium in a piece of property.
During the second century B.C., a new type of ownership came to life as a result of
the need to address pressing socioeconomic issues. Starting from early times, as
the Roman agrarian society began to rely on a market based economic system,
foreigners started to be a part of the commercial and social life in Rome and
accordingly, the need to integrate them into the legal system of Rome surfaced.
The office of the urban praetor (praetor urbanus) was created in 246 B.C. and
gradually assumed the title of prateor peregrinus, mainly dealing with the legal
standing of foreigners. It was the procedural protection (actio publicana in rem) of
the foreigners’ acquisitions, provided by this new office of prateor peregrinus,
which gave way to a new type of ownership.57 This new form of ownership was
called ‘bonitary ownership’ (in bonis habere) and unlike dominium ex iure Quir-
itium, the protection was not limited in regard to its subject-matter. Res Mancipi
or res nec mancipi, all property could be the object of bonitary ownership.
Before moving on to examine restrictions on property rights in Roman law, it
is important to underline the fundamental division of properties in Roman law:
Res Extra Patrimonium – Res in Patrimonium. The property that was considered to
be res extra patrimonium could not be in private ownership and could not be the
object of any legal transaction.58 Such property was either related to divine law
(res divini iuris) or ‘human law’ (res humani iuris). The properties of human law
(res humani iuris) included res publica, res communes omnium and res universita-
tis. Res publicawas the public property that was under the ownership of the State.
56 The restrictions concerning res mancipiwere not only confined to whom they could be owned
by, but also to how they could be transferred and acquired. They could only be transferred or
acquired by the ‘ius civile’modes of acquisitions them being: in iure cessio andmancipatio both of
which involved a great deal of publicity. Mancipatio was done in front of five witnesses and a
‘lipripens’ whereas in iure cessio had to be done in front of a magistrate. Both modes of transfer
could only be done by Roman citizens (Gai. I. 14(a)).
57 The changing socio-economic dynamics were the driving force behind the transformation of
the Roman concept of ‘ownership.’ However, the incorporation of new moral and religious
perceptions into the Roman thought should also not be overlooked. Bülent Tahiroğlu, Roma
Hukukunda Mülkiyet Hakkının Sınırları, 3rd ed., Der Yayınları, Istanbul, 2001, p. 23. The influence
of Greek philosophical schools such as Stoicism and Epicureanism and various Eastern belief
systems contributed to the rising individualist sentiments in the society; the individual was no
more an inseparable part of the State. See Clifford Herschel Moore, Individualism and Religion in
the Early Roman Empire, 2.2 The Harvard Theological Review, 1909, pp. 221–234. Law (and
property law in particular) was not immune from all of those changes as well.
58 D. 18, 1, 6, pr; D. 18, 1 34, 1.
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Therefore, this type of ownership was public ownership and the rules of public
law were applicable. Things such as roads, public squares, piazzas, constantly
flowing water and ports were committed to the use of the people.59 Res Communes
omnium was the property that was considered to be the common property of all
people, such as air, water, rivers, sea and the coastlines. This type of property was
under the ownership of neither the State nor the people. Anyone could make use
of them. As long as there was no law that prohibits it, the fish one catches in the
river or the sea belonged to him. Or if one had constructed a hut on the coast of
the sea, he would be considered to be the owner of it as long as that hut stood.60
Lastly, Res Universitatis was the property belonging to a corporate body (civitatis
ormuncipia) such as theaters, circuses and stadias.61
The property that was considered to be res in patrimonium, on the other hand,
could be the object of private property and any legal/commercial transaction.
This group of property consisted of all types of properties that were not res extra
patrimonium.
2.3. The public law limits on the right to property in Roman law
This section illustrates how Roman property law was constantly engaged in
striking a balance between the individual and the community, even with respect
to resources considered res in patrimonium. The types of limits discussed in the
following subsections demonstrate, therefore, that Roman property law was far
from focusing solely on empowering the individual owner.
2.3.1. Limits concerning graveyards
The first posited restrictions on ‘the right over property’ under Roman law can be
observed in the Law of the Twelve Tables. This law had prohibited the inhumation
or cremation of corpses within the city borders (pomoerium).62 The prohibition
concerning inhumation accommodated religious concerns,63 as well as health
59 Pomponius had divided the res publica in to two different categories: in publico usu (public
property all people can benefit such as roads and theaters) and in pecunia populi (public property
which the State benefits such asmines) (D. 18, 1, 6 pr.)
60 D. 17, 10, 13, 7.
61 D. 43, 8, 2, 9.
62 Tabula X 1. “Hominem morum in urbe ne sepelito neve urrito” (A dead person shall not be
buried or burned in the city); Cicero,De Legibus 2, 23, 58.
63 Giuliano Bonfante, Corso di Diritto Romano, Vol. 2, Milano 1966, p. 304.
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and safety ones.64 Since the general standard for the Romans was to bury their
dead in their own land, this prohibition was a clear restriction on what a person
could do with his own property, if his land was situated within the city borders.65
The failure to comply with this prohibition would result in the land where the
dead had been buried becoming a religious site (locus religiosus).66 Accordingly,
the land would lose its commercium, which meant that it could not be the subject
of an ownership right or any other judicial act anymore and could not be pledged,
transferred or acquired in any way.67
Cremation, on the other hand, was prohibited for the sake of public safety.
The main rule in regard to cremation was that it was forbidden to burn any
corpses inside the city walls and cremation was only permitted outside the city
border as long as the cremation took place at least 60 feet away from the nearest
building.68
The aforementioned limits were not the only property restrictions that dealt
with inhumation or cremation. If someone had buried a corpse or its remains in
another person’s land without the owner’s consent or knowledge, then the
owner could not exhume them without a permissive decision from the priests or
from an imperial enactment.69 In such a case, the owner’s freedom to use his
property at his will was restricted for religious purposes. Another case of
religiously motivated restrictions on land ownership was the statutory easement
of the right of way to a burial site (iter ad sepulchrum), which could be
considered as one of the first cases of a ‘statutory right of the way.’ If someone
had to pass through another person’s land in order to tend to a grave or exercise
any kind of worship in the burial place then the owner of the land that is to be
passed through was expected to grant a right of way to the person concerned.
Otherwise, the right of way to the burial site would be provided by the magis-
trate in exchange for compensation.70 The ‘iter sepulchrum’ was a part of public
64 Cicero,De Legibus 2, 24, 61.
65 Vittoria Scialoja, Teoria della Proprieta nel Diritto Romano, (ed.) Pietro Bonfante, Vol. 1,
Anonimia Romana Editoriale, Rome, 1928, p. 331.
66 Making the graveyard a res religiosia. (Gai 2, 3; D. 1,8,1). Heinrich Siber, Römisches Recht in
Grundzügen für Die Vorlesung, Römischen Privatrecht, 2nd ed., Wissenschaftliche Buchges, Darm-
stadt, 1968, p. 63.
67 Gai I, 2, 6; Gai I. 2, 7.
68 Cicero, De Legibus,2, 24, 61.
69 D. 11, 7, 8 pr; D. 8,1, 14 pr.
70 Actio sepulchri violata was a penal action granted in case of the violation of a grave (actio
sepulchri violata).
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law and later had been protected with imperial edicts. Its public characteristic
was evident by the fact that the praetorian action actio sepulchri violati was an
actio popularis71 and an actio perpertua.72
2.3.2. Limits concerning buildings
The restrictions concerning buildings also date back to the times of the Law of the
Twelve Tables. The law included a rule, which provided for a minimum of 2.5 feet
(sesterius pes) gap between buildings.73 The rationale behind that rule was to
sustain a steady stream of air within the city and to mitigate the risk of spreading
in case of a fire. This ambit of 2.5 feet was called ‘ambitius’ when it separated
buildings and ‘confinium’when it separated farms.74
The limit of ‘ambitius’ was a restriction that was about the construction of the
buildings. Another restriction that dealt with buildings was not about their
construction but their preservation: that is the case of Tignum Iunctum. Tignum
was the beans and logs used in the construction of a building. However, at the
time, the term also included, on a broader sense, any material used for construc-
tion purposes.75 The Twelve Tables had explicitly stated that it was prohibited for
a person to separate the logs and beans of a building or vineyard owned by
another person, even if he himself was the owner of the logs or beans, as long as
the building where the material was used in its construction stood firm.76 Here, it
is not the ownership of the building or the vineyard that was restricted but the
71 Actio Popularis was a penal action which could be brought by anyone of the people to protect
the public interest.
72 Actio Perpetuawas the type of action which could be brought without any time limit.
73 It would not bewrong to say that the rule of ambitiuswas not observed faithfully. For example,
during the rebuilding of Rome following its sack by the Gauls, this rule of ‘sesterius pes’ gab was
not complied with at all. See Dennis Serrigny, Droit Public at Administratif Romain, Vol.1, Paris,
1862, p 464. Emperor Nero had reinstated the rule after the ‘Great Fire of Rome’ and his successors
had to uphold it. During the later years of the Empire, the ambit between buildings in the city was
extended to 12 and 15 feet. (D. 8,2,14). Any building in the city which had been constructedwithout
complyingwith this rule was to be demolished.
74 Actio finium regundorumwas the action that dealt with disputes relating to ‘confinium.’ This
action served to settle the disputes between neighbors over the boundaries of their lands. It could
result in the transfer of a portion of land from one party to another into full ownership.
75 Most probably due to the developments in the construction industry and the usage of material
other than logs and beans in the construction process. See Raymond Monier, Historia de la
propriete fonciere a Rome et dans l’Empire Romain, Paris 1953, p. 120.
76 XII Tables (6,8).
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movable goods used in their constructions.77 The motive behind such a prohibi-
tion was the ‘public need’ to preserve buildings and the desire to foster the
cultivation of vineyards.
The preservation of buildings was not confined to the prohibition of separat-
ing the Tignum Iunctum. The temple of Jupiter Stator was the first all-marble
building in Rome but it was not until the Empire that the use of marble became
widespread. Still, starting from the time of Julius Caesar,78 the use of expensive
material in constructions, such as marble, had become common.79 With the
marble replacing wood and bricks in the construction of the buildings, new types
of restrictions regarding the demolition of buildings had surfaced, in response to
novel ways of making speculative profits out of the practice of demolishing
buildings and selling their materials. Two different senate decrees (senatus con-
sulta)80 of the early Imperial period had prohibited this practice.81 The prohibition
was reaffirmed by the Senatus Consultum Acilianus, dated 122 A.D.82
Other prohibitions and proscriptions in the same vein followed:
– The owners were under the duty to repair or restore their buildings and were
compelled to follow through the construction of their buildings once it
commenced.83
– In 245 A.D., a prior address of Emperor Marcus Aurelius concerning repairing
charges had been re-established: Accordingly, co-owners of a building that is
to be repaired or restored had to disburse their share of the expenses. If a co-
owner refused to comply then he would lose his share over the property after
a four-month period.84
– In 321 A.D., Emperor Constantine had prohibited the dismantlement of mar-
bles and columns of an urban building for the purpose of installing them in a
77 The owner of the material had an action ‘actio tignum iunctum’ which could be directed
against the owner of the building for double the value of the material, provided that the material
was used in bad faith. However, a claim for the separation of thematerial was not admitted.
78 It is generally accepted that the use of marble in Roman constructions started with Julius
Cesar’s starting the Luna (Carrara) quarries (Carmelo G. Malacrino, Constructing the ancient world:
Architectural techniques of the Greeks and Romans (trans) by Jay Hyams, Getty Publications, Los
Angeles 2010, p. 25).
79 Suetonius referred to Emperor Augustus’s boast about his urban development efforts: “Urbem
latericium invenit, marmore reliqiuit” (He found the city a city of bricks; he left it a city of marble)
(Suetonius,Divinus Augutus, 28.3).
80 Senatus ConsultumHosidianum (44 AD) and Senatus ConsulumVolusianum (50 AD).
81 Desolate buildings which were not suitable to be used as a dwelling were excluded.
82 In 398 AD, the prohibition was extended to public buildings.
83 D. 1, 18,7; C. 8, 10, 8.
84 C. 8, 10, 4. also see (D.17.2.52.10)
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countryside house regardless of the possibility that both houses were owned
by the same person. Moreover, the urban building and the separated material
would be confiscated by the State. The rationale behind this prohibition was
to sustain city beautification. Accordingly, the dismantlement of such materi-
al from a desolate building that was to be installed in an urban building in
another city was permitted. In 362 A.D., the scope of the prohibition was
expanded to include the dismantlement and replacement of building col-
umns for any reason.85
2.3.3. Limits concerning natural resources
Any citizen who owned land along the coast of the sea or the bank of a river had
to bear with anyone who used the property for the purposes of fishing or transpor-
tation. These owners also had to allow the fishermen or boatmen to tie their boats
to trees in their land or unload their cargo there.86 Especially during the classical
law period, all coastline and rivers were open to the use of all citizens.87The
praetorian interdict uti priori aestate did forbid anything to be built in a public
river or its banks as this could cause the water to flow in a reverse direction than
usual.88 Being a public law remedy, any Roman could resort to the praetor and
invoke this interdict. The praetor could also compel the defendant to undo what
he had done in the river or its banks with an interdictum restitutium.89
The situation of mines was different in the way that during the classical law
period the property right of the owner of a mine was nearly absolute. As long as
the owner did not consent to it, no one could operate that mine.90 However,
during Justinian’s reign, the property right of mine owners became extremely
restricted. According to this new principle, it was permitted to dig and operate a
mine, provided that 10 percent of what had been acquired was paid to the State
treasury and another 10 percent was paid to the owner of the mine. Actually, the
classical Roman law maxim: “cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad
infernos” (He who owns the soil owns everything above and below from heaven to
hell) was no longer applicable during the post-classical period. We can see
85 Raymond Monier, Du Mancipium au Dominium, Essai sur l’appariation et le developpement de
la notion de propriete en droit Romain, Les Cours de droit, Paris, 1947, p. 103.
86 D. 1, 8, 3, 5 pr.
87 Ulpian talks about a distinction between public rivers (fluminae publica) and private rivers
(aquae private). However, the essence of the distinction between them is not that clear (D. 43,13).
88 D. 43,13,1 pr.
89 D. 43,13,1,11-13
90 D. 8, 4, 13, 1.
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numerous imperial enactments that restrict the property rights of private persons
when the object of the property right is a mine.91
2.4. Confiscation, expropriation and public utility in Roman law
In modern times, the most common State-based interferences with a person’s
ownership right are the practices of ‘confiscation’ and ‘expropriation.’ Both ‘con-
fiscation’ and ‘expropriation’ refer to the seizure of private property by the State.
The difference is that with ‘expropriation,’ the State seeks to meet a public need
and in order to realize this target, it seizes (expropriates) the property of a private
person in exchange for ‘fair’ compensation. However, the State ‘confiscates’ the
property of a private person with the aim of penalizing that person. Therefore, the
main differences between those two practices can be summed up such that in
expropriation there is the element of ‘public good’ and it is done in exchange for a
payment, whereas confiscation is penal in nature and accordingly is done without
any compensation; the confiscated property becomes a part of the ‘treasury.’
When we turn to Roman law, we can observe that the public act of ‘confisca-
tion” (confiscatio) was very much present in the Roman system. Although the
Roman State resorted to the act of confiscatio mainly in cases concerning high
treason,92 one can observe other cases where private property was seized by the
State. For example, the lex Julia de maritandis ordinibus, which was Augustus’s
legislative answer to the social and ‘moral’ problems of Roman society, made the
offence of adultery a crime punishable by exile and confiscation of property. On
the other hand, the majority of Roman law scholars believe that the institution of
‘expropriation’93 did not exist in Rome as a legal instrument but rather as a
practical display of State power.94
The scope of the limits on expropriation is generally drawn within the vague
borders of ‘public good.’ Therefore, the institutions of ‘expropriation’ and ‘public
utility’ under Roman law should be also addressed when dwelling on cases of
91 See C. 11, 7 (6) 3; C. 11, 7 (6) 3.
92 Lex iula maiestatis; D.48,4,1,1
93 The Latin term ‘expropriate’ does not appear in classical texts.
94 See WW Buckland, The Main Institutes of Roman Private Law, Cambridge University Press,
1935, p.103; Özcan Karadeniz Çelebican,Roma’da Kamulaştırma ve KamuYararı, Ankara Üniversi-
tesi Yayınları, Ankara, 1975 p. 6–9; Pietro Bonfante, Corso di diritto Romano: La Proprieta, Vol 2,
Giuffre, Milano, 1963, p. 247–248 ; Max Kaser, Roman Private Law (trans.) by Rolf Dannenbring,
2nd ed., Butterworths, London, 1968, p. 97; Bülent Tahiroğlu, Roma Hukukunda mülkiyet hakkının
sınırları, 3rd ed., Der Yayınları, Istanbul, 2001, pp 79–82.
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property restrictions based on the authority of the State.95 First, it must be stated
that there is little controversy in regard to the assumption that there existed no
legal institution of ‘expropriation’ in Roman law. However, that assumption
should also not lead to the conclusion that the Romans had no notion of the State
carrying the authority to seize its citizens’ property. The public order was viewed
as being outside of the legal sphere and therefore expropriation existed in Rome,
not in Roman law. Thus, the difference with modern law is that there was no
general rule or maxim that covered such instances in Roman law; it was as
practical as it could get. Still, even during the classical law period, one can
observe the more or less equivalent of modern expropriation albeit in the form of
a ‘forced sale’ (emptio ab invito)96 only for the purposes of the construction of
aqueducts and alleys.97 And similar to modern times, it was also acknowledged
that such an action on behalf of the State was an exception and should had been
done only under certain circumstances and for a limited number of reasons.
During the Republican period, it can be seen that various laws were enacted,
including specific prohibitions of the practice of emptio ab invito.98 It should also
be stressed that during the ancient law and the classical law periods, the Roman
State did not feel the pressing need to confiscate or expropriate land since most of
the land actually belonged to the State. In the earlier times, most of the land was
95 It is important to distinguish between “necessity” and “utility” in this context. It may be
debatable whether the cases where an overriding necessity (such as a fire hazard) leads, for
example, to the demolition of a property, should be considered as an act of ‘expropriation’ with a
legal/legislative foundation or a mere display of supreme executive authority by relevant offi-
cials.
96 This was a technical term concerning the seizure of one’s land in exchange for compensation.
Out of all the public interferences on one’s property, emptio ab invitowas the closest to themodern
act of ‘expropriation’ (Özcan Karadeniz Çelebican, Roma’da Kamulaştırma ve Kamu Yararı,
Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınları, Ankara, 1975, p. 13 fn. 42.)
97 In that regard, it is interesting to observe the parallels between Roman law and Islamic law.
Despite the fact that in Islamic law ‘expropriation for public utility’ is of recent introduction, the
origins of the institute can be found in the practice where the command of the Kadı (judge)
concerning the sale of the property that is to be expropriated, superseded the consent of the
owner. (Saba Habachy, Property, Right and Contract in Muslim Law, Columbia Law Review, Vol 62
(1962) p.456; Hossein Askari & Zamir Iqbal & Abbas Mirakhor, Introduction to Islamic Economics,
Wiley, 2015, p. 58 also see David Santillana Istituzioni di Diritto Musulmano Malichta, 2nd ed.,
Istituto per l’Orient, Vol I, 1938 p. 357 fn. 5). Termed “legitimate duress” (ikrah hükmi) by Muslim
scholars, this practice is undoubtly very similar to Roman law’s “forced sale” (emptio ab invito) as
in both instances the consents of the sellers are tainted with the ‘legitimate’ duress by the State’s
(authority) rendering this invalidity of the juristic acts as inconsequential.
98 Such as two agrarian laws; one sponsored by tribunus Servilius Rullus (BC 64) and one of
Gaius Julius Caesar’s Lex Iulia Argaria (BC 59) or the imperial edict of Augustus, Edictum
Venafranum (BC 20–30).
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owned by the State, while during the classical period quiritarian ownership over
provincial land was not allowed, and since the late republic such land was
deemed to be owned by the State.
On the other hand, there is little doubt that the institution of ‘expropriation’ is
recognized and practiced in a legal form during the Dominate period.99 The
‘public utility’ purpose of expropriation is emphasized, and the legal framework
is identified more clearly during this period as compared with the classical
period.100 However, public utility (public utilitas) was a very broad term in the
Roman mind and we can observe various terms that had been used to express the
‘good of the public’ such as ‘rei publicae utilitas,’ decus rei publicae,’ pulchritudo
civitatis,’ ‘magna nécessitas,’ ‘urguens nécessitas,’ ‘communis commoditas’ and
'inevitabilis.’ This shows us that the Roman notion of the ‘good of the public’ was
not limited to urgent economical necessities of the people but also included
aesthetic and artistic considerations.
The organization and the functions of the Roman State were not based on a
written constitution. The sovereign right (imperium) of the State was considered
to be part of the field of politics, not part of the legal sphere. Therefore, to claim
that a Roman constitutional and administrative law existed, in the modern sense
of these terms, may hint to an anachronism.101 Throughout the political history of
the Roman State, it can be observed that the functions of the State bodies that
possessed imperium were designed as a consequence of the socio-economic and
political circumstances within the society. It was the conventional perpetuity of
the State bodies and their functions that provided for the stability and balance of
the Roman public institutions.102 The lack of general legal principles that could
provide guarantees for the basic rights of the citizens combined with the fact that
all functions of the State were seen as a part of the absolute public power
imperium, had prevented the formation of precise and definite legal rules con-
cerning the relations between the State and the citizens.103
99 See C. Th. XV. 1. 39; C. Th. XV. 1. 50. ; C. Th. XV, 1, 51; C. Th. XV, 1, 53.
100 Even the Emperor Augustus did hesitate to expropriate for public utility (WW Buckland &
Arnold D. McNair, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison Outline, 2nd ed., Cambridge
University Press, 2008, pp. 94–95).
101 TheodorMommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, Graz Vol I., 1953 pp. 169; Henrik Siber,Römisches
Verfassungsrecht, Lahr, 1952, pp. 65–66; Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des Römischen Rechts, München
1935, p 111.
102 F.M De Robertis, Sulla espropriazione per pubblica utilità nel Diritto Romano, Studi Guido
Zanobini, Vol. V, Milano, 1965 p.144.
103 Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, p. 169; F. M. De Robertis, 'Emptio ab invito', sul
problema della espropriazione nel Diritto Romano, Estratto dagli Annali della Facoltà di Giurispru-
denza della Università di Bari, VolumeVII-VIII, 1945-46–47, p. 199.
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Therefore, it was only natural that according to the Roman understanding of
public services which supposed that all State functions (including the carrying
out of public services) were part of imperium, expropriation – which was one of
the most vital ways to generate revenue for public services – would not be
considered as a distinct legal institution. This was so because in such a case,
expropriation did not need to be based on an authority specifically granted to
public bodies as an exception to the absoluteness of private individual property.
2.5. Roman land law: between individual and community
The tension between the individual and the community as regards the definition,
allocation, protection and exercise of property rights is not a modern phenomen-
on. Historically speaking, such a tension is emphasized in religious laws, but a
secular system such as Roman law seems also not to have been devoid of it.
We argue that the aforementioned cases of property restrictions (and the fact
that most of them could be demanded with an actiones populares104 or a common
interest interdict) are sufficient to indicate that in Roman law, the restrictions on
property rights were meant not only to prevent interferences with another per-
son’s private property rights (such as reciprocal limits among neighboring land-
owners), but also to limit individual property rights for the sake of communal and
societal considerations.105 The difference between religious laws and Roman law
in this regard may be that while religious laws were conceived from the beginning
as having a moralistic nature based on a certain social vision, Roman law
gradually acquired such characteristics because of social, political and economic
necessities.106 For example, the limits – or the lack thereof – of the property right
over slaves becamemore and more problematic in the Roman society owing to the
mistreatment of the slaves and the way this affected a certain part of the commu-
nity.107 This led to various restrictions as to what the master could do with his
slaves.108 It would be also fitting here to remind the fact that the concept of
104 See supra note 71.
105 Religious considerations are includedwithin this scope.
106 This does not mean, of course, that religious laws were inherently static and not susceptible
to any development through interpretation or othermeans.
107 See, e.g., Seneca, Epistulae Morales, Letter 47 (trans) by RM Gummera, Loeb Classical Library
Harvard University Press, London, 1979, p. 300; Cicero,De Officiis, I.13.43.
108 See, e.g., Lex Petronia (61 A.D.) which prohibited masters frommaking their slaves fight wild
animals unless a permission from the competent magistrate was granted. See also D.48,8,11,2;
D.18,1,42. Justinian also stated that one should refrain from abusing his property right over his
slave as this prohibition of abuse was closely related with the “public interest” (Inst. I.8.2: expedit
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“public interest” was eventually arrived at because of pressing new needs. As the
republican tendencies grew, the State had relied on fresh principles for its
continuum. The sole principle of “religion” was required to be replaced with the
new principle of “public interest.”109
Another important fact to mention is that the “doctrine of the abuse of rights”
was never fully developed under Roman law110 as the exercise of a legally stated
right could never be construed as an abuse.111 However, the first theoretical
instance of the formulation of the doctrine can also be found in the Institutiones of
Gaius.112 Moreover, the exceptions of “exceptio doli generalis” and “specialis” with
which the defendant could plead the other party’s fraud (and all his other actions
in bad faith) as a procedural defense may also be considered as the historical
origin for the doctrine of abuse of rights.113
Therefore, the efforts to give Roman law a strong ideological outlook and
present Roman law as “the bulwark of individualist capitalism, materialist in its
outlook and favoring selfishness at the expense of the public good”114 must be
approached with caution. The gradual shift of importance from the individual to
the social domain was ideological/political in nature.115
It is true that the certain aspects of the Roman property right had constituted
a model for the ‘liberal’ concept of property right116 and for various contemporary
enim rei publicae, ne quis re sua male utatur). The interests of the masters were subordinated to
communal interests. (Alan Watson, Slave Law, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,1987,
p.121; See also Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and The idea of Absolute
Ownership, Acta Juridica, 1 (1985), p. 24; WW Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery, The Lawbook
Exchange Ltd., 2001, pp. 36–39).
109 N. Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1980, pp. 309–310.
110 Pietro Bonfante, Corso di diritto Romano: La Proprieta, Vol 2, Giuffre, Milano, 1963, p. 290 ;
WW Buckland & Arnold Duncan, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparision in Outline, 2nd
ed., Cambridge, 2008, pp. 97–100; HC Gutteridge, Abuse of Right, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol.5,
no.1, 1933–1935, pp. 22–32.
111 D. 50,17,55 nullus videtur dolofacere qui auo iure utitur (no one is considered to have
committed a wrong who exercises his legal right); D.50,155.1: non videtur vim facere qui iure suo
utitur (he is not deemed to use force who exercises his legal right).
112 Gai.Inst. I. 55 (...male enim nostro iure uti non debemus....) (...We should not exercise our
rights wrongfully..).
113 Andreas Schwarz, Roma Hukuku Dersleri, (trans.) by Türkan Rado; 7th ed.; Istanbul, 1965,
p. 213.
114 HF Jolowicz, The Political Implications of Roman Law, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 22, 1947,
p. 62.
115 On the link between the decline of the individualistic concept of property and the emergence
of nationalism and political unification movements during the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
see Gottfried Dietze, In Defence of Property, H. Rodney Co, Chicago, 1963, p. 128–133.
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legal concepts such as “freedom of contract”which can be regarded as giving way
to the market-based economy grounded on predictability find their origins in
Roman law.117 It is also true that the Roman private law institutions and concepts
had provided for the basis of framing the language and the methodology within
which the conceptualization of various modern political theories became possi-
ble.118 The Roman ‘dominum’ had become a generalized signifier of absolute
proprietary power of one over another and played a central role in the royal and
dynastic politics of Renaissance Europe.119 The French royalist jurists identified
the king as a domunus which helped them embed all the sovereign authority and
regal rights120 into the princely property right of dominum, giving way to its
succession by heirs.121
At the same time, however, Roman law represented the legal system of the
most complex society that came out of the ancient world and managed to carry its
presence on such a diverse landscape for hundreds of years following its official
dissolution. Roman law owes this trait to its success in managing to stay stable
while gradually developing. Throughout its life, the Roman legal system was
tested many times with the inevitable forces of change only to adapt its institu-
tions and models to the emerging new realities. Accordingly, it is perfectly
plausible to envision that the principles of the same law which had developed a
sophisticated legal system for the inhumane institution of slavery may also be re-
issued to spearhead the modern crusades of environmental protection or animal
rights. Thus, many principles of Roman law would be applicable if one wanted to
rely on Roman private law institutions and concepts for the promotion of collec-
tive societal values or for the safeguarding of human dignity and freedom as such
116 There were no restrictions on the ius quirtum mode of ownership. The ancient law did not
acknowledge any statutory easments deriving from neighbouring relations. The owner of the land
was also deemed to own every natural resource that is part of the land. Land ownership was
perpetual and not subject to any tax. (Pietro Bonfante, Historia du Droit Romain, trans. by Jean
Carrère & François Fournier; Vol. I, Paris, 1928, pp. 207–208).
117 see James Gordey, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine, Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1991, p. 30 et seq.
118 JN Figgis, Political Theory from Gershon to Grotius, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 121;
Gerald Strauss, Law, Resistance, and the State: The Opposition to Roman Law in Reformation
Germany, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1986, p. 123.
119 Daniel Lee, Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought, Oxford University
Press, 2016, pp. 91–97, 101–105.
120 Since these were considered res incorporales.
121 Daniel Lee, Private Law Models for Public Law Concepts: The Roman Law Theory of
Dominium in the Monarchomach Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty, The Review of Politics, Vol. 70,
No. 3 (Summer, 2008), pp. 370–399.
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considerations gradually transfused into Roman law.122 Such an attitude would
not be that different from the case where the French monarchomachs had relied
on Roman private law institutions themselves123 in order to discredit the French
Royalist School’s ‘Dominum theory’ or to lay down the mechanics of constitu-
tional change and resistance.124 Roman law was – and still is – utilized as a
weapon in the political arena of the ideological battles.125 Furthermore, property
rights in Roman law may be considered to be epiphenomenal since the economic,
social and political changes directly influenced and fragmented the Roman
understanding of ownership and caused various restrictions that are not that
different in nature when compared with the restrictions brought about by the
emergence of the ‘social function of property’ doctrine. The social function of
property, although not present since the beginning of Roman law, nonetheless
gradually became an aspect of the Roman understanding of property as a quasi-
intended consequence of the transformations that the Roman individual, society
and State have undergone.
122 To cite a few examples: the quasi-contract of ‘negotiorum gestio’; the concept of just price
(iustum pretium) and the principle of ‘laesio enormis’; the various applications of “obligatio
naturalis” which in time came to include obligations deriving from social/moral duties. Another
interesting example would be the emergence of the delict ‘in iura’ which is considered to be the
historical origin of the modern crime of insult. Roman law is known to be the first system that
legally acknowledged the non-psychical, ‘incorporeal’ personality compromised of personal
reputation, honor and dignity. Thus starting from about BC II. Century, any unlawful attack
against individual ‘personality’ in the forms of insult and libel was subjected to punishment via
the praetorian edicts and the action of ‘actio iniurarium’. See Ruth Walden, Insult Laws in The
Right to Tell: The Role of Mass Media in Economic Development, Ed. Roumeen Islam, Washington,
2002, p.210; Bülent Tahiroğlu, Roma Hukukunda Iniura, İÜ Yayınları, Istanbul, 1969, pp.23–26;
Salvatore Di Marzo, Roma Hukuku, (trans.) by Ziya Umur, 2nd ed., İU Yayınları, Istanbul, 1959,
pp. 479–480; Rudolph Sohm, The Institutes, (trans.) by James Crawford Ledlie, 3rd ed., Clarendon
Press, Oxford, 1908, pp. 422–423. See also Gai.I.3,220 and D.45.10.1.2.
123 The critics of the Royalists had reminded that Roman law never regarded the fiscus to be a
part of the personal property of the princeps. The Manorchomachs, by crafting a corporatist
concept of the people, did deny the royal dominum in favour of the people (populus) who were
assumed to be ‘a legal person’ in civil law terms. Daniel Lee, Private Law Models for Public Law
Concepts, The Roman Law Theory of Dominium in the Monarchomach Doctrine of Popular
Sovereignty, The Review of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 3, Summer, 2008, p. 382–383.
124 Id., at p. 377.
125 Walter Ullman, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, Cornell University Press, Itahca, 1973,
p. 77; Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999,
pp. 2–3.
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3. Comparing current constitutional structures for the right to
property and land law: Turkey and India
In this part, we select two constitutional contexts having seemingly different
policy preferences as to the right to property, namely Turkey and India. Since
both are emerging economies, they may provide touching stones to better under-
stand the role of contemporary public law restrictions on the right to property and
economic growth, and to observe the recent effects of those restrictions on
different rights’ owners as well as on sustainable development and environment.
During the years when the right to property was enshrined as a fundamental
right in the constitution, India witnessed unimpressive rates of growth. But after
this right ceased to be a fundamental right in 1978, India experienced remarkably
rapid growth from 1991 until 2009. In contrast, Turkey has generated its economic
growth under a constitutionalized right to property.
3.1. Turkey
In Turkey, the right to property is guaranteed as a fundamental right and its
constitutionalization traces back to the modernization period of Ottoman legal
and political structures in the nineteenth century. The economic regression and
political turbulences that severely affected the Ottoman Empire as of the mid-
eighteenth century led to the modernization of Ottoman legal and political
structures, based on the adoption of basic constitutional documents, first in form
of pacts and charters, and then through legal codifications and the enactment of
the first constitution in 1876. In this period of constitutionalization, basic guaran-
tees as to the right to property, including prohibition on excessive and arbitrary
taxation, were also at the center of the debate and the various normative ap-
proaches. In the era of republican constitutionalism, Turkey kept on the approach
of respecting the constitutional value of the right to property. In the 1961 constitu-
tion, the right to property and its public law restrictions and safeguards such as in
matters of expropriation, preservation of forests and nationalization are regulated
in the constitution under the chapter on social and economic rights. The 1982
constitution changes this constitutional design by placing the right to property
under civil rights in line with liberal economic policies. However, it still stipulates
public law restrictions and guarantees under the heading of social and economic
rights. The rights to property and to inheritance are explicitly cited as civil rights.
Principles of legality, and the public good or the public interest as a ground for
restriction on the exercise of the right to property, are also stipulated in the
relevant constitutional provisions (article 35 para. 2 and 3).
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Under Turkish constitutional conceptualization, public property clauses,
such as bans on ownership in regard to coasts and forests and State duties about
property in land are prevalent. Some of them are regulated under social and
economic rights and some of them are stipulated under different constitutional
provisions of economic nature. These clauses include limits on State intervention
in immovable properties, safeguards for the protection of the public interest, and
positive obligations of the State in regard to the protection of vulnerable groups,
such as farmers with insufficient land of their own or forest villagers. In the
Turkish political discourse of the late 1960 s and the 1970 s, land law reform was
perceived by some of the political parties as a tool for promoting less developed
regions that exhibited strong patterns of unequal distribution of land ownership
and low rates of human development. Nevertheless, a land law reform was never
implemented in its broad sense, although there are countrywide and regional
development projects or plans for the protection of small farmers and land-
owners. Taking into account effective use of agricultural lands, protection of
forests and coasts, and promotion of organic products and olive agriculture,
various laws were adopted that partly met the challenges of economic growth and
protection of the public interest for the sake of livelihood and the right to environ-
ment as entrenched in the Turkish constitution. Here, we put emphasis on issues
regarding the impacts of two different sets of constitutional norms that became
the subject of various legal disputes at both the national and regional levels
mostly against the background of rapid economic growth, environmental con-
cerns, challenges of urbanization, or lack of trustworthy records for real estate.
The first issue deals with the property rights of local and traditional agricul-
tural farmers, who are also producers of olive and owners of olive trees. Agricul-
ture based on olive trees refers to a historical tradition in Anatolia, especially in
the Aegean region of Turkey. It is the main source of income for local inhabitants
and it is also deemed as a cultural heritage for wide segments of the west
Anatolian population. In a recent case known as Yirca, the name of the village
where the legal dispute became the subject of public attention, the clash of claims
between the right to property of local farmers and the economic interest of the
investor in an energy project were brought into the legal scene. Yircamade a huge
impact on the debate in Turkey in regard to the effective protection of environ-
mental rights, property rights of small farmers, and one-sided governmental
policies favoring economic interests of energy investors in Turkey.
The case is a result of an urgent expropriation procedure, which is not
defined in the constitution, but is enabled by the Law on Expropriation. The
Law allows for the application of an urgent expropriation procedure for pur-
poses of national defense as prescribed in the National Defense Law, in cases of
urgency determined by the Cabinet or under extraordinary circumstances de-
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fined by specific laws. In the Yirca case, the Cabinet has approved the urgent
expropriation of lands used for olive agriculture and owned by local farmers in
favor of the energy company Kolin, which constructs a power plant based on
coal. This decision of the Cabinet was not welcomed by the owners of the lands
and olive trees, and it became a matter of concern for the local community,
environmentalist groups, and opposition parties. As the objections of the own-
ers and the local community were raised, the energy company Kolin felled a
total of 6,666 olive trees in the expropriated land.126 The locals tried to guard the
olive grove for more than 52 days. As the trees were cut down by Kolin group,
public officers did not take any measures to prevent the cuttings and the total
destruction of the area. There were extensive clashes between private security
officers and the locals during the protests and cuttings. Cries and vows of local
owners for the olive trees as well as ill-treatment of protestors by private
security officers and police were quite visible in the Turkish mainstream media.
The urgent expropriation decision issued by the Cabinet was brought before the
Council of State, the supreme administrative court in Turkey, on the ground of
there is a specific legislation in Turkey on the protection of olive groves, known
as Olive Law. Olive Law as a lex specialis prohibits constructions having detri-
mental effect on olive groves within a 3 km radius or on olive tree lands. Since
olive tree lands are mostly located in the Aegean and Mediterranean towns of
Turkey, it is well known that rent-seeking groups or individuals have a huge
interest in those lands for building holiday resorts or construction projects for
summer houses and villas. The Olive Law has been regarded as an obstacle for
those groups for many years, even though there are also patterns of severe
violations of this law and similar ones. However, in the Yirca case, the matter of
dispute was not a direct violation by a company or an individual. Instead, the
violation is in fact provided and facilitated by the Cabinet’s decision under the
urgent expropriation procedure, seemingly in line with the Law on Expropria-
tion. The Council of State accepted the case of Yirca local farmers on the basis
of the Olive Law and the lack of a public interest, and it issued an interim relief
order that prevented the construction of power plant in the olive groves.127 The
126 For critiques, a description of the course of events, and other issues see “Yırca’daki köylüleri
dövdüler, 1 saatte 6000 zeytin ağacını kestiler” (The villagers in Yirca were battered and 6,000
olive trees were cut down),” Cumhuriyet, 7 November 2014; Emre Kızılkaya, “New Turkey seizes
private property like old Ottomans,” Hürriyet Daily News, 9 February 2015; “Bakanlıktan Büyük
İtiraf (A Big Confession fromMinistry),” Evrensel, 16 July 2014; “Turkey’s Council of State cancels
rapid expropriation decision for Yirca olive grove,”Hürriyet Daily News, 26 December 2014.
127 Council of State, E. 2014/7272, K. 2014/8748, 16 December 2014. For the local court’s decision
see alsoManisa Administrative Court (First), E. 2014/1079, 20 March 2015.
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Yirca case has proven that the protection of the right to property of local farmers
can go hand in hand with claims on the right to the environment, which is
explicitly guaranteed in the constitution. In light of the Yirca case, it also
becomes clear that an isolated interpretation of an expropriation case that
requires compensation under the Turkish constitution is not sufficient to solve
the complex issues in regard to the economic interests of local farmers, environ-
mental friendly development models based on traditional production methods,
and energy demands of a growing economy.
The second issue deals with Turkey’s constitutional approach to the right to
property, land law restrictions, and protection of environmental values. It is
related to the ownership of forests, which became a matter of dispute before the
European Court of Human Rights. The matter of dispute is based on the fact that
the constitution states that forests are under the care and supervision of the State.
The ownership of State forests cannot be transferred. Ownership of these forests
cannot be acquired by prescription, nor shall servitude other than that in the
public interest be imposed in respect to such forests (article 169 paragraph 2 of
the constitution). The judgment of the Court in Turgut and Others v. Turkey, no.
1411/03, 8 July 2008, has relied on the interpretation of this constitutional clause
in light of the right to property.
The case dealt with the registration of land, belonging to the applicants, in
the name of the State’s Treasury for nature conservation purposes, without the
payment of compensation. The Court determined that until the annulment of their
title and its re-registration in the name of the Treasury, the applicants had been
the rightful owners of the property, with all the consequences arising from their
title, and they had further benefitted from “legal certainty” as to the validity of the
title recorded on the land register, which provided undisputable evidence of
ownership. The applicants had been deprived of their property by a national
judicial decision. The Court decided that the purpose of the deprivation imposed
on the applicants, namely the protection of nature and forests, fell within the
public interest. However, it further reiterated that where there was deprivation of
property, consideration had to be given through means of compensation provided
for in domestic legislation. It was observed in the case at hand that the applicants
did not receive any compensation for the transfer of their property to the Treasury,
in conformity with the constitution. No exceptional circumstance had been raised
in order to justify the lack of compensation. Consequently, the failure to award
the applicants any compensation had upset, to their detriment, the fair balance
that had to be struck between the demands of the general interest of the commu-
nity and the requirements of the protection of individual rights. This case trig-
gered many similar cases before the Court in which the Court found similar
violations. In the end, the Turkish Supreme Court had to change its case law and
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created a new domestic remedy in which the applicants of such cases can ask for
compensation at the domestic level.
3.2. India
Moving to the case of India, it should be highlighted at the outset that the right to
property has been the cause of a long period of conflict (1950–78) between the
parliament and the judiciary. During this conflict, judges were accused of class
bias because they struck down legislation intended to expropriate land from
landlords with large holdings, paying little or no compensation, and to redistri-
bute the land to ‘tillers’whilst protecting the tenants’ right to property.
The conflict between the two branches of government could not be on
account of different ideologies. The champion of land reforms, Prime Minister
Nehru, had an even more aristocratic class background compared to that of the
judges who struck down legislation abolishing zamindaris (ownership of large
estates). The reason for the conflict has more to do with the difference in what
policy-makers believe it is possible and necessary for them to do and what judges
think is permissible to do. Policy-makers think in terms of ‘more or less’ with
shades of grey. Prime Minister Nehru believed that landlords who had exploited
their tenants, had extravagantly pompous life-styles and were also compradors of
the British Raj, deserved to have less protection for their property, whereas the
tenants or tillers to whom the state redistributed the land ought to have their
property protected in greater measure. The tendency to shift blame and responsi-
bility for the failure of land policy reached its high point in 1975 when a state of
internal emergency was imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The suspen-
sion of fundamental rights was defended by the government with the claim,
among others, that judicial review of agrarian legislation obstructed redistribu-
tion of surplus land and other egalitarian measures.
The Constitution’s Forty-Fourth Amendment was intended to make it difficult
to suspend fundamental rights and impose emergency rule, as was done on
grounds of ‘internal disturbance’ in 1975. But this Amendment also removed the
right to property from the list of fundamental rights. Property is now recognized
as a legal right in Article 300A of the constitution: “No person shall be deprived
of his property save by authority of law.” The constitution does not lay down any
principles to be followed by laws enabling the taking of property. There is no
guarantee of compensation at market value or stipulations about reasonable
standards.
The only provisos in the Amendment are that the removal of property from
the list of fundamental rights would not affect the right of minorities to establish
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and administer educational institutions of their choice, and that the right of
persons holding land for personal cultivation and within the ceiling limit to
receive compensation at the market value would not be affected.
Among the key economic reforms related to land was the repeal, in 1999, of
the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Repeal Act, 1976. This act illustrates how
professed egalitarian aims can be thwarted, and end up achieving the opposite
result. No land was acquired and put to any public purpose under this law. It
served the interests of government ministers because they could use the discre-
tionary power vested in them to waive the application of provisions of this law in
specific cases. The law became the basis for rent seeking, leading to a severe
shortage in land for sale and a steep increase in land prices, hurting poor people
the most because they could not afford the inflated costs of land for housing.
There are many laws in India under which the State may acquire private land
for public purposes. The most commonly used eminent domain legislation is the
Land Acquisition Act of 1894. This has been used for a variety of public purposes
such as building roads, bridges, dams, public establishments, institutions, devel-
opment of urban areas, public housing schemes, etc. But it has also been misused
by governments. There are many reported cases where governments have ac-
quired land, ostensibly for a public purpose, and transferred that land to private
developers to build malls, commercial centers and industrial units, instead of
expecting developers to purchase land needed for commercial purposes on the
open market. Similarly, large scale acquisitions have been made on behalf of the
companies by invoking the provisions contained in Part VII of the Act (Acquisi-
tion of Land for Companies). Farmers whose land is generally acquired by the
government for such purposes have little knowledge about their constitutional
and legal rights.
Recognizing that such injustices have become rampant, India’s parliament,
with rare consensus among the major political parties, passed the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Reset-
tlement Act (LAAR), 2013. This Act intends to safeguard the interests of indigen-
ous people (‘tribals’ as they are called in India) and stipulates norms for fair
compensation, resettlement and rehabilitation of persons displaced on account of
land acquisition. It has new provisions for social impact analysis and recognition
of non-owners as affected persons, and it prescribes some norms of free, prior
informed consent of people affected by land acquisition.
From the point of view of inclusiveness, a dozen laws that affect vulnerable
and marginalized people continue to be in force. Nearly 90 percent of the central
government’s land acquisition in mineral-rich region has been carried out under
these other laws, and it may be the case that the new and more progressive land
acquisition legislation will not be used very extensively.
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The Government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi amended the 2013 Act
on 31 December 2014 by means of an Ordinance (executive legislation that needs
to be endorsed by parliament). This Ordinance creates a special category of
projects, which are exempt from many requirements for land acquisition that are
part of the 2013 Act. These include consent of 80 percent of persons affected by
acquisition, social impact assessment, review by an expert group, and it removes
the ban on acquisition of multi-crop agricultural land for industrial or commercial
use. Provisions for return of unutilized land after a period of time have been
diluted. Instead of five years stipulated in the Act, the Ordinance allows retention
of land by government for the period specified for the setting up of any project for
which land was acquired. The definition of ‘private entity’ for whose benefit the
government can compulsorily acquire land has been expanded to include pro-
prietorships, partnerships, companies, non-profit organizations and any other
entity under any law in force.
Three fundamental problems remain with respect to property rights in land in
India. First, land records are poorly and not uniformly maintained. Second, price
reporting is episodic and highly inaccurate. Third, titles over landed property are
presumptive and never conclusive. This is a weakness that is often exploited by
powerful land mafias making every land transaction open to interminable legal
disputes. The executive branch has a strong interest in maximizing its power of
eminent domain. In the past, the judiciary in India resisted that impulse and
sought to protect the right to property as a fundamental right. Now it is no longer
a fundamental right and the property of the weak and vulnerable is at risk of
being taken over by the State to promote industrialization and urbanization.
However, the absence of a fundamental right to property is also a matter of
concern for foreign investors.128
128 In a recent case involving the defanged right to property in Article 300A of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court said, in a judgement delivered by Chief Justice S. H. Kapadia: “Rule of law as a
concept finds no place in our Constitution, but has been characterized as a basic feature of our
Constitution which cannot be abrogated or destroyed even by the Parliament and in fact binds the
Parliament. In the Kesavanda Bharati case, this Court enunciated rule of law as one of the most
important aspects of the doctrine of basic structure. Rule of law affirms parliament’s supremacy
while at the same time denying it sovereignty over the Constitution. Rule of law as an overarching
principle can be applied by the constitutional courts, in the rarest of rare cases, in situations, we
have referred to earlier and can undo laws which are tyrannical, violate the basic structure of our
Constitution, and our cherished norms of law and justice. One of the fundamental principles of a
democratic society inherent in all the provisions of the Constitution is that any interference with
the peaceful enjoyment of possession should be lawful. Let the message, therefore, be loud and
clear, that rule of law exists in this country even when we interpret a statute, which has the
blessings of Article 300A. Deprivation of property may also cause serious concern in the area of
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4. Approaches of international human rights bodies to the
right to property and land law
This section moves to study contemporary conceptions of land law and their
limits in the public interest from the perspective of supranational norms. The first
subsection deals with the American Convention of Human Rights and the juris-
prudence on the right to property in the context of land, as developed by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The second subsection deals with the
European Convention on Human Rights and the ways in which the general frame-
work developed by the European Court of Human Rights has impacted national
legal systems as these strike a balance between individual and community in
crafting land law.
4.1. American Convention of Human Rights: respecting rights of indigenous
people and property in land
The American Convention of Human Rights,129 which currently brings together 25
Latin-American countries, includes the right to property in Article 21.130 The work
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, entrusted with the authority to oversee the members’
adherence to the Convention, has drawn particular attention in the context of
land law disputes brought forward by indigenous tribes that have contested
domestic legislation and regulation as allegedly infringing the right to property.
One such example is a petition filed in 2001 by the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous
Community of the Enxet People to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, alleging that the government of Paraguay violated Article 21 of the Con-
foreign investment, especially in the context of international law and international investment
agreements. Whenever, a foreign investor operates within the territory of a host country the
investor and its properties are subject to the legislative control of the host country, along with the
international treaties or agreements. Even, if the foreign investor has no fundamental right, let
them know, that the rule of law prevails in this country.” K. T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka, Supreme Court Cases (SCC 9, 2011) 1, 141–42.
129 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969,
O. A. S. T. S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
130 Article 21 reads: “1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law
may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society. 2. No one shall be deprived of
his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social
interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. 3. Usury and any other
form of exploitation of man byman shall be prohibited by law.”
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vention.131 The tribe argued that the government had failed to complete its own
initiative to recover part of the ancestral lands of the tribe of over 14,000 hectares
in the Chaco region of Paraguay, even though Paraguayan law recognizes the
right of indigenous peoples to preserve their way of life in their habitat and to
protect the claimed lands. As a result, community members had to live in
inhumane conditions, resulting in a number of deaths due to lack of food and
medical care. The government contended that, although it was committed to
solving the matter, the lands in question had been formally purchased by a
German citizen, who uses the land for beef production. Consequently, the execu-
tive branch’s efforts to expropriate the land had been met with staunch resistance
by the legislature in view of the 1993 bilateral investment treaty between Germany
and Paraguay.
In March 2006, ruling in favor of the tribe, the Inter-American Court reasoned
that the enforcement of bilateral investment treaties may not allow a state to
infringe its obligations under the American Convention. The Court also reasoned
that although it is “not a domestic judicial authority with jurisdiction to decide
disputes among private parties” (here, the German owner and the tribe members),
it is nevertheless competent to “analyze whether the State ensured the human
rights of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa Community.” According to the Court,
the government’s recognition of the tribe’s rights to traditional lands remains
“meaningless in practice if the lands have not been physically … surrendered
because the adequate domestic measures necessary to secure effective use and
enjoyment of said right … are lacking.” The Court ordered the State to adopt
measures to return the land to the Sawhoyamaxa Community.
In June 2014, after many delays, and two other rulings by the Inter-American
Court in favor of indigenous tribes in Paraguay, President Horacio Cartes signed
into law a bill that orders the expropriation of the land from the German owner
and its return to the tribe.132
This ruling, alongside other cases in which the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights held in favor of indigenous tribes by holding that customary land
tenure is protected under the right to property and is thus binding on the Conven-
tion’s member states,133 offers intriguing insights into the construction of land law
as a balancing act between individual and community interests. On the one hand,
131 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C.), No. 146
(Mar. 29, 2006).
132 Giles Constantine ‘Paraguay: Indigenous Community Records Rare Land Rights Victory’
(2014), available at: https://eyeonlatinamerica.wordpress.com/2014/06/20/paraguay-indigen
ous-land-rights-victory/.
133 Id.
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the validation of the right to property seems to empower individual interests over
those of the state. On the other hand, the context in which these interests are
validated is one in which the collective interests of a socially- and historically-
disenfranchised group eventually prevail over those of a foreign investor, who
tries to shield himself behind an interstate investment treaty to protect his
individual gains. The Court is clearly committed to a broader social goal of
preventing historical injustice and alleviating the current distress of tribe mem-
bers. As such, one may view the ruling as largely intended to promote the public
interest, such that the evocation of the right to property is aimed at putting the
community before the individual owner.
4.2. European Convention on Human Rights: diversity of conflicts arising from
land law restrictions
This subsection surveys the effects of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention”)134 on
national land laws, and the growing role of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in developing case law in the matter. After drawing the general framework
and applicable principles, we exemplify the restrictions on land law through
country specific case-law of the ECHR regarding Spain and Turkey.
4.2.1. General Framework under the European Convention on Human Rights
According to Article 1 of Additional Protocol 1 (AP-I): 135
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one
shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
134 Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
135 On the right to property in ECHR jurisprudence, see Javier Barcelona Llop, Propiedad,
Privación de la Propiedad y Expropiación Forzosa en el Sistema del Convenio Europeo de Derechos
Humanos, 2013; Mar Aguilera Vaqués, “El Reconocimiento del Derecho a la Propiedad Privada y
los Límites a la Regulación (art. 1 P1)”, in Javier García-Roca & Pablo Santolaya, (eds.), La Europa
de los Derechos: El Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, 3rd ed., 2014, p. 669–692; and the
work of Lasagabaster Herrarte, Iñaki, in Lasagabaster Herrarte, Iñaki (ed.), Convenio Europeo de
Derechos Humanos. Comentario Sistemático, 2nd ed., 2009, p. 763–799.
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The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
Article 1 comprises, therefore, three distinct but connected rules:136
1. The first rule is of a general nature: principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions (first
sentence, first para.);
2. The second rule concerns ‘deprivation’ of possessions and subjects it to certain condi-
tions (second sentence, first para.);
3. The third rule entitles states to ‘control the use of property’ in accordance with the
‘general interest,’ by enforcing such laws as they deem necessary for the purpose
(second para.).
The second and third rules “are concerned with particular instances of interfer-
ence with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be
construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule.”137
The property jurisprudence of ECHR had initially opted for a relatively narrow
review of the deprivation or regulation of property, focusing on a lawfulness or
“quality of law” principle under which states had only to demonstrate that they
complied with the formal requirements of their legal system and that such rules
were sufficiently “accessible, precise and foreseeable.”138
This approach changed in the 1982 Sporrung and Lönnroth v. Sweden139 and
1986 James v. United Kingdom140 cases, in which the ECHR developed self-stand-
ing criteria of “fair balance” and “proportionality” for reviewing domestic legisla-
tion or regulation. Both disputes arose in the context of land law. The Sporrung
case dealt with the validity of an expropriation order for multiple land plots in
central Stockholm. The James case addressed a statute in the United Kingdom
that conferred on tenants residing in certain types of houses on long leases the
right to purchase the freehold of the property from the owners at below market
rates.
136 D.J Harris, M. O’Boyle &Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 2nd ed.,
2009, p. 666 et seq.
137 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Portugal [GC], 2007, para. 62.
138 Tom Allen, ‘Compensation for Property under the European Convention on Human Rights,’
28Michigan Journal of International Law 287 (2007).
139 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1982).
140 James v. United Kingdom, 8 Eur. H. R. Rep. 123 (1986).
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According to its now established approach in analyzing a complaint under
Art. 1 of AP-I, the Court will first analyze if the applicant has an interest which can
be classified as a possession. If this is the case, the Court will first consider if there
has been a ‘deprivation’ (first paragraph second sentence); if not, it will then
analyze if there has been a ‘control of the use’ of possessions (second para.). Only
if there has been neither of them will the Court consider whether there has been
some other interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions (first sen-
tence, first para).141 However, whichever sentence/paragraph applies, the test
adopted by the Court in determining whether there has been a breach of Art. 1 will
be very similar, and it will come down to the issue of proportionality. In any case,
the Court does not always indicate under which sentence a case is being
decided.142 In general, interferences (deprivation of or controlling the use of
property) must be proportional, that is to say, the interests of the individual must
be weighed against the collective interest, and a fair balance must be struck. The
individual must not be required to bear an excessive burden.
If a deprivation of property is to strike a fair balance between the demands of
the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of
the individual’s fundamental rights, in principle, some compensation should be
paid to the individual.143 In the Court’s case law, the taking of property without
payment of an amount ‘reasonably related’ to the market value of the property at
the time of the deprivation is normally held to constitute a disproportionate
interference.144 While the absence of compensation for a measure limiting the use
of property is not in itself sufficient to constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, the availability of compensation is one of the factors, often an important
one, in the overall assessment of proportionality of the measure.145 In particular,
the lack of compensation weighs heavily in a situation where the infringement of
the right of property is excessive and affecting the very substance of ownership.
In this type of situation, where the impugned measures are of particular severity,
domestic law should provide for compensation in order to avoid placing a
disproportionate burden on the individual.146
141 Robin C.A.White & Clare Ovey. The European Convention on Human Rights (5th ed, Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2010), p. 479.
142 D.J Harris, M. O’Boyle &Warbrick, supra note 136, p. 667.
143 Id. at p. 680.
144 See, e.g., Perdigao v Portugal [GC], 16/11/2010, para. 68.
145 See, e.g., Depalle v. France [GC], no. 34044/02, § 91, 29 March 2010; and also Galtieri v. Italy
(dec.), no. 72864/01, 24 January 2006;Massa v. Italy (dec.), no. 29247/04, 20 August 2007;Goletto
v. France (dec.), no. 54596/00, 12 March 2002.
146 For example, in Housing Association of War Disabled and Victims of War of Attica and Others
v. Greece, no. 35859/02, 13 July 2006, a building prohibition imposed on all of the applicants’ land
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However, full compensation is not always required, e.g., in nationalization
cases the measure of compensation does not have to be the market value.147
Again, where the purpose of an expropriation is to pursue political or economic
reform, or to achieve a change of a country’s constitutional system from mon-
archy to democracy, lesser payment may be acceptable.148 Another example
where legitimate objectives in the public interest may result in less than full
compensation is the purpose of protecting historical and cultural heritage. On the
other hand, a total lack of compensation may only be justifiable under excep-
tional circumstances.149
Compensation must be paid within a reasonable time. Long delays in the
payment of compensation, particularly where there is high inflation or an inade-
quate payment of interest on the late payment will lead to a violation of the
article.150
There must be safeguards in place to assess the reasonableness of the
compensation. Therefore, the method for determining compensation must be
even-handed between the state and the individual.151 The Court gives importance
to granting individuals an opportunity to make representations in the valuation
proceedings. Individual circumstances (e.g., the applicant’s attachment to the
family home, the historical value of the building) are important in calculating a
fair compensation. Especially in case of individual expropriations, all the relevant
factors must be taken into account in determining compensation. There may be
exceptional cases where consideration of such circumstances will not always be
required, e.g., major nationalization programs may require a standardized ap-
proach to the calculation of the compensation to be paid.152 In general, the
following its classification as protected woodland without any compensation was not compatible
with Article 1 of Protocol no.1 in which it held: “The Court is particularly struck by the fact that,
although the very substance of the applicants’ ownership has been affected (see Sporrong and
Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 23, § 60), the applicants
were not successful in obtaining compensation under Greek law. This, combined with the State’s
ultimate refusal to expropriate the applicants’ property or to exchange it for new land of equal
value, aggravated considerably the adverse effects on the applicants’ situation and placed a
disproportionate burdenon them.” Id.para 39.
147 D.J Harris, M. O’Boyle & Warbrick, supra note 136, p. 681; White & Ovey, supra note 141, p.
494.
148 For the expanded margin of appreciation granted to states under such conditions see
Broniowski v Poland [GC], 22/06/2004, para. 149.
149 White & Ovey, supra note 141, p. 493. See, e.g., Jahn and others v Germany [GC], 30/06/2005.
150 White & Ovey, supra note 141, p. 494. See, e.g., Akkuş v Turkey, 09/07/1997.
151 White & Ovey, supra note 141, p. 493.
152 D.J Harris, M. O’Boyle & Warbrick, supra note 136, p. 682. White & Ovey, supra note 141, p.
494. See, e.g., Lithgow v UK, A 102 (1986).
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national method of calculation of the compensation will only violate P1–1 if it is
arbitrary or grossly unfair.
This supranational set of standards, however, is far from creating a uniform
blueprint for the domestic ordering of land law. As is the case throughout the
ECHR jurisprudence, the review of national law is subject to the margin of
appreciation principle. That said, there seems to be a difference between the
scope of the margin in cases said to implicate the “deprivation” of property under
the European Convention’s first paragraph of Article 1 of the First Protocol and
those dealing with regulation that works to “control the use of property” under
the second paragraph. The first type of cases is usually subject to a higher level of
scrutiny in applying principles of fair balance and proportionality, such as in
determining due compensation for the deprivation of property. In contrast, in
evaluating regulation that controls the use of lands without expropriating it, the
ECHR has granted states a particularly wide margin of appreciation.
Finally, the right to property also imposes on states certain positive obliga-
tions to protect the enjoyment of possessions. This includes an obligation to
protect against private interferences. Indeed, “The purpose of ECHR is primarily
that of protection against direct governmental intrusion of the private sphere (...).
But, founded on the effectiveness principle, the European Court has developed
implied positive obligations as well. A positive obligation means that the ECHR
might include a duty for the State to do something in order to protect or promote
people’s rights. Those positive obligations can even extend to require public
intervention in a genuinely inter-personal dispute (the so called third-party effect
of the Convention).”153
Hence, the ECHR has extended the right to property to bilateral controversies
between individuals, provided any sort of governmental action or inaction, even
if weak, is found.154
153 Ploeger, Hendrik D., & Groetelaers, Daniëlle A., “The Importance of the Fundamental Right
to Property for the Practice of Planning: An Introduction to the Case Law of the European Court of
Human Rights on Article 1, Protocol 1”, European Planning Studies, Vol. 15, No. 10, November
2007, p. 1437. See also Monica Carss-Frisk, “The Right to Property. A Guide to the Implementation
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights”, Human Rights
Handbook No. 4, 2001, available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Dis
playDCTMContent?documentId=090000168007ff4a.
154 “As with other rights and freedoms of the Convention, the Court has recognized that in
principle, the State may be responsible under Article 1 for the interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions resulting from transactions between individuals. However, for the
State’s responsibility to be engaged it is necessary that the facts complained are the result of an
exercise of State authority and that they did not concern exclusively contractual relations between
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In Öneryıldız (GC, 30/11/2004), Turkey was held responsible for the loss of life
and destruction of property as a result of an explosion in a refuse tip nearby the
applicants’ homes. Similarly, in Budayeva, which concerned a natural disaster,
the Court also held that the state has a positive obligation to avoid the destruction
of property. At the same time, unlike the positive obligation under the right to life,
where the risk is of destruction of property is at stake, the authorities enjoy a
wider margin of appreciation. In contrast, the State cannot be expected to act to
prevent loss of value as a result of market factors (there is no such positive
obligation). In that sense, inflation does not impose an obligation on the State to
maintain the purchasing power of sums deposited with financial institutions.155
As a result of these developments, in addition to dealing with the quintessen-
tial public law aspects of land law, i.e. those dealing chiefly with vertical legal
relations between the State and private parties, the ECHR has also addressed a
number of petitions that alleged a breach of Article 1 in what was essentially a
private law dispute. In such cases, plaintiffs argue for a conflict between the
European Convention and the body of national land law that orders legal rela-
tions among private persons.
The most prominent example is the J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom
case.156 The case dealt with adverse possession of registered private land. The
applicants, the land’s former owners who had lost their case before the national
courts, argued that the then-in-force English adverse possession law, the Land
Registration Act of 1925, was in violation of Article 1. The ECHR’s Section 4
Chamber ruled that the case did engage the first paragraph of Article 1, and
that although English adverse possession law may be deemed as serving a
genuine public interest, the interference with the registered owners’ rights was
disproportionate and thus in violation of Article 1. The Grand Chamber reversed
that finding. It noted that “the margin of appreciation available to the legis-
lature in implementing social and economic policies should be a wide one”
and that this approach is “particularly true in cases such as the present one
where what is at stake is a long-standing and complex area of law which
regulates private-law matters between individuals.” Moreover, the Grand Cham-
ber held that “it is characteristic of property that different countries regulate its
use and transfer in a variety of ways. The relevant rules reflect social policies
private individuals.” Pieter van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn & Leo Zwaak (eds.), Theory
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th ed., 2006, p. 865.
155 Ryabykh v Russia, 24/07/2003.
156 J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 44302/02, Judgment of Aug. 30, 2007,
2007-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 365.
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against the background of the local conception of the importance and role of
property.”
A somewhat different approach has been taken by the ECHR in its 2012
Lindheim v. Norway decision.157 The Court reviewed a 2004 amendment to Nor-
way’s Ground Lease Act of 1975, which subjected the leasing of lands for
permanent homes or holiday homes to special statutory regulation, entitling
lessees to demand an unlimited extension of the contracts on the same condi-
tions as applied previously once the agreed term of the lease has expired. The
ECHR referred to its previous case law about “the margin of appreciation avail-
able to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies.” But it
nevertheless held that the statutory intervention in lease contracts, even if
looking to address the growing pressure on real estate prices, placed its social
and financial burden solely on the applicant lessors, not striking a “fair balance
between the general interest of the community and the property rights of the
applicants.”
4.2.2. Spanish and Turkish practices on land law restrictions and European
Court of Human Rights
One of the latest examples of the expansive jurisdiction of the ECHR, and its effect
on national law and practice of placing limits on property rights in land, is the
recent decision in the case Sociedad Anónima del Ucieza v. Spain, Application
No. 38963/08, of 4 November 2014.158
The plaintiff, a Spanish limited company, bought a piece of irrigated land in
Spain in 1978. According to the description in the Land Register, several build-
ings had been built in that piece of land, including a church, a house, a
windmill, a farmyard and several watermills. The land was part of the ancient
monastery of “Santa Cruz de la Zarza,” founded in the twelfth century, nationa-
lized by Spanish authorities in the nineteenth century and sold at auction by the
State. Therefore, the Land Register mentioned that one of the buildings (the
church) was formerly the chapel of the monastery. That church was a parish
church at least from the beginning of the seventeenth century, first served by
the monks and later by parish priests of the diocese of Palencia. The bishop of
Palencia issued a certification on the property of the church, which was regis-
157 Lindheim v. Norway, Apps. nos. 13321/08 and 2139/10, Final Judgment dated Oct. 22, 2012,
Eur. Ct. H.R.
158 The only official text is written in French. No translation to English is offered in the web page
of the Council of Europe (HUDOC).
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tered in the Land Register on 22 December 1994. The plaintiff addressed an out-
of-court claim to the bishopric, which was answered by the bishop, asserting
that the church had always been a parish church belonging to the bishopric, as
the nationalization of the nineteenth century did not include parish churches
according to the statutory law of that time. On reading this, the plaintiff filed a
lawsuit against the bishopric claiming its right of property over the church and
the annulment of the contradictory registration on the Land Register. The action
was dismissed by the Judge of First Instance number 5 of Palencia, who affirmed
the right of property of the bishopric. The plaintiff brought an appeal, dismissed
on the same ground by the Provincial Court of Palencia (judgment of 5 February
2001). The plaintiff then asked the Spanish Supreme Court for review in cassa-
tion, but this court did not hear the case, as the controversy did not comply with
the minimum economic amount required (EUR 600,000). Neither did the Span-
ish Constitutional Court intervene, as the case lacked “constitutional interest,”
according to its decision of 26 February 2008.
The plaintiff argued violation of article 6.1 of the Convention (right to a fair
trial) and of article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 (right to property), in combination
with article 14 of the Convention (prohibition of discrimination). The Court
unanimously found a violation of article 6.1 of the Convention and stated that
no separate claim of discrimination was admissible. It also held that there had
been a violation of the right to property, with a dissenting opinion of Judge
Motoc.
Leaving aside the right to a fair trial, which exceeds the boundaries of this
paper, the Court declared that there had been an interference with the right to
private property of the plaintiff, as the registration of its land, which has impor-
tant consequences in Spanish law and included the chapel, had been rendered
ineffective by court decisions. This interference amounted to a breach of the
peaceful enjoyment of its possession, namely by the church: although it pursued
the general interest, it did not involve any compensation, imposing thus a
disproportionate burden on the company.
The ECHR judgment purported to protect the peaceful enjoyment of its
possession by the applicant. Nevertheless, previous national litigation discussed
precisely the ownership of the church building. National courts concluded that
the plaintiff did not enjoy any right on it, neither property nor possession, and
had never enjoyed them: it had always been a possession of the bishopric. The
ECHR judgment thus directly contradicted Spanish courts in its interpretation of
the applicable law and concluded that (1) the plaintiff possessed the church; (2)
this possession had been subject to interference from national authorities
(namely, the courts of justice); and (3) this interference imposed a disproportion-
ate burden on the plaintiff (as no compensation was awarded).
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As it is well-known, the concept of “possessions” in article 1 of the Protocol
No. 1 must not be interpreted according to national categories.159 The ECHR
normally explains why the national interpretation of the right is not consistent
with the Convention. In the commented case, the only reason given to acknowl-
edge a European right of property to the plaintiff was its registration of the piece
of land in the Land Register, which included the church building, as did the
registration of the bishopric. However, according to Spanish law, real rights,
including property rights, are acquired and conveyed apart from the Land Regis-
ter, even if they are later subject to registration,160 which is not even compul-
sory.161 That is why previous litigation in the case did not rely on the Land Register
to decide the controversy. It is at least dubious that these points of Spanish law
should be deemed contradictory to the European right of property.
In sum, in this case the ECHR shows little respect for Spanish jurisdiction, in
deciding on the right of property once it found a violation of the right to a fair
trial, and although it has little understanding of the Spanish law of property,
when interpreting the concept of “possessions” in article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. We suggest that this sort of private law controversies, in which public
authorities involvement limits the working of the courts and of the Land Register,
are probably better adjudicated at the national level.
Moreover, as observed in Sociedad Anónima del Ucieza v. Spain, the payment
of compensation appears to be an important indicator in assessing the depriva-
tion of property. It is a well-established principle of the Court’s case law that the
taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value
will normally constitute a disproportionate interference.162 However, it should be
clear there is no requirement to pay compensation for any type of interference
with the right of property.163
159 Among most recent judgments, see Akhverdiyev v. Azerbaijan, Application No. 76254/11, of
29 January 2015, at 73. According to Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, supra note 136, at p. 865: “the
concept of possession is autonomous.”
160 See, for example, José Enrique Gomá Salcedo, Instituciones de Derecho Civil Común y Foral,
vol. I, 2004, p. 638–641.
161 José Luis Lacruz Berdejo, & Francisco de Asís Sancho Rebullida, Derecho Inmobiliario
Registral, 1984, p. 57.
162 SeeKozacıoğlu v. Turkey, cited above, § 64, for a recent recapitulation of the principles.
163 In this respect, the distinction between deprivation of property and a control of use of
property was highlighted already by the Commission in Baner v. Sweden, no. 11763/85, Commis-
sion decision of 9 March 1989),where it was held: “It follows from the case-law of the Convention
organs that as regards deprivation of possessions there is normally an inherent right to compensa-
tion (Eur. Court H.R., James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 36,
para. 54 and Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 51, para. 122).
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As to the lack of compensation in the deprivation of property, Turkish cases
have been quite exemplary. For instance, in Börekçioğulları (Çökmez) and others
v. Turkey, no. 58650/00, 19 October 2006, the absence of compensation for de
facto occupation and subsequent transfer of property title to the State due to 20-
year statutory limitation period was considered as a violation of the right to
property. In this case, the applicants inherited a plot of land which was being
used by the Ministry of Defense as a military base and they brought an action for
compensation claiming that the Ministry had not conducted expropriation pro-
ceedings or compensated them for the damage resulting from the illegal occupa-
tion of the land. Domestic courts held that the Ministry had been in actual
possession of the land over fifty years and rejected the case as being time-barred.
The applicants continued to pay the land tax every year, until the court’s further
decision by which their title to the land in question was transferred to the State.
After this decision, the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled the law provision
concerning the limitation period as being unconstitutional. The ECHR, in addition
to the conclusions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, noted that the impugned
law provision had not provided adequate protection to the landowners as it had
required them to claim compensation for deprivation of property rather than
obliging the authorities to pay it automatically. Moreover, the fact that the time-
limit for claiming compensation ran from the de facto occupation had allowed the
administration to benefit from a situation already existing when the relevant law
had entered into force. The application of the relevant law provision by the
domestic authorities had the consequence of depriving the applicants of the
possibility of obtaining damages for the annulment of their title. In the absence of
adequate compensation in exchange for their property, the interference in ques-
tion, although prescribed by law, had not struck a fair balance between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. Thus, the ECHR found a viola-
tion and made an award for a pecuniary damage amounting to EUR 373,000.
In Sarica and Dilaver v. Turkey, no. 11765/05, 27 May 2010, the Court held that
the widespread practice in Turkey of de facto expropriation by the State repre-
sented a structural problem and was contrary to the Convention. This practice
enabled the Turkish authorities to occupy property without any formal declara-
tion of transferring ownership. They could also change the prospective use of the
property irreversibly. The practice forced people to start court proceedings in
However, in the Commission’s view such a right to compensation is not inherent in the second
paragraph. The legislation regulating the use of property sets the framework in which the property
may be used and does not, as a rule, contain any right to compensation. This general distinction
between expropriation and regulation of use is known inmany, if not all, Convention countries.”
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order to have such occupation of land quashed or in order to receive compensa-
tion. Under article 46 ECHR (binding force and execution of judgments) the Court
indicated that Turkey should also take general measures in order to make the
process of expropriation less unforeseeable and arbitrary and to secure compen-
sation. Turkey should also actively discourage de facto expropriation by measures
of deterrence and by holding the people responsible to account. Reforms in this
area are thus now called for in Turkey.
An important issue for Turkey was the matter of real estate pertaining to
foundations established by minorities residing in Turkey. The problem was
caused by the case law of the Turkish Court of Cassation, which held in 1974
that foundations belonging to minorities cannot hold real estate other than
those stated by 1936. Therefore, many real properties belonging to such founda-
tions were taken from their hands as land registries to their name were can-
celled and the property transferred to the State. In Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfı
v Turkey (judgment of 9 January 2007), this practice was found to be in violation
of the Convention since these foundations had obtained possession of such
properties lawfully at the time and the provisions of the Law on Foundations
allowed community foundations to possess real estate. The European Court thus
decided that restitution of this property through re-registration of the property
to the name of the foundation in the Land Register would suffice, and that in
case of failure to do so, Turkey would have to pay compensation. This judgment
set an important precedent, since much real estate which once belonged to
minority foundations was in the hands of the State. In February of 2008 the new
Foundations Law (Law no. 5737) entered into force. It provides the legal frame-
work for returning the real property previously transferred to the State. In
August 2011, a decree supplemented the above law with provisions for compen-
sation of communities, which could not recover their properties because these
had been acquired and registered by third parties. These regulations enabled,
by September 2011, the registration of 181 properties in the name of non-Muslim
community foundations.
In conclusion, it is apparent from the above overview that the Court takes into
account a variety of factors when assessing whether the measures taken by the
states in the context of land law regional planning and development are such that
they impose an excessive burden on the individual property owner. Given their
wide margin of appreciation in implementing measures in this area and restrict-
ing the use of property in the general interest, the provision of compensation does
not necessarily come into play in all cases. However, if compensation is available
in whatever form (monetary indemnity, exchange of land, payment of rent, etc.)
or amount, the balance is likely to tip in favor of the State. Conversely, the lack of
possibility to claim any compensation in combination with other shortcomings in
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law, procedure or practice has frequently been considered as offering inadequate
protection of the right of property.
In the absence of any compensation, the existence of laws and procedures
providing the individual with an opportunity to effectively challenge the im-
pugned measure and to allow for the weighing of the different interests at stake
becomes a matter of crucial importance. Nevertheless, it is now established that
even if a procedural protection is deemed adequate, a measure which entails
serious and harmful consequences for the individual requires the payment of
compensation for it to be compatible with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1.
Conclusion
Over the course of history, many recurring themes seem to have emerged in the
context of land law and the limits on the right to property. These basic dilemmas
cut across geographical borders, political settings, historical circumstances, and
technological developments. Some of the questions raised are as old as humanity
itself; others take up a new form with the change of times. The current era of
globalization is therefore not entirely unique.
As this Article has shown, one such core issue concerns the balance between
individual and community in constructing legal norms on the right to own, use,
and alienate assets, and land in particular. Just about every legal system, with its
specific backdrop of political forms of control, religious or moral convictions, and
socioeconomic structure, has grappled with the need to delineate the boundaries
between private and public control over land. An inherent complexity embedded
in such an effort has to do with the fact that identifying “individual” and
“community” for purposes of such line-drawing may change for time to time and
from place to place. On the one hand, numerous societies across history have
seen the family, clan, or some other cluster of persons as the core subject of law.
On the other hand, the promotion of “public” or “social” goals often breaks
away from a single concept of “State” or “government.” Religious, moral, or even
contemporary jurisprudential concepts developed by supranational treaties and
tribunals may diverge from the ways in a certain state government may identify
“public,” “social,” or “community” interests. Accordingly, the challenge of deli-
neating the boundaries between individual and community in land law could be
seen as a focal point for the much broader debate, in every society throughout
history, about the appropriate balance between the private and public spheres.
This insight also sheds light on the question whether the debate over land law
and limits on the right to property has changed substantially in the current era of
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the human rights discourse. While the situation may be certainly different for
other provisions included in human rights treaties and case law, the analysis
throughout the article may lead to counterintuitive results in regard to land law
and the limits on the right to property. When we move away from misconceptions
of Roman law as focused solely on individual rights or of religious laws as static
or fixed conventions unwilling to respond to changing circumstances in land
systems, then we may come to realize that the current debate about the balance
between individual and community interests is not truly novel. This is definitely
not to say that the focal point or the swing of the pendulum between private and
public interests does not change across eras or across borders. But one claim can
be stated with quite some confidence:
The current jurisprudence of international human rights tribunals employs
new terminology, such as “fair balance” and “proportionality,” but at their core,
these legal concepts rely on the very foundational premises that guided the
lawmakers of the Twelve Tables and numerous laws, constitutions, codes, and
judicial cases since then throughout human history. Land continues to be a
resource that has no equal in the way it brings together dilemmas about the role
of humanity, the justifications for the existence of governments, and the distinct
place of the individual within society. No two cultures give the same answers. No
two religions preach the exact same principles. No two courts follow the exact
same jurisprudence. They all deal, however, with the same set of fundamental
questions, and in particular with the inherent balance that needs to be struck, in
the context of land law, between individual and community interests.
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